Where now for ballistic missile defence? more

Where now for Ballistic Missile Defence: choices and constraints for the Obama administration Andrew Futter Writing at the start of a new Presidential administration and trying to make sense of the likely road ahead is not unsimilar to the subject of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD); both involve trying to hit a moving target and both have had a mixed record of success to date. Baring such a caveat in mind it is still worthwhile taking stock on where the issue of Ballistic Missile Defence has got to and what its future may entail in the post Bush era of a new Democratic Presidency. Obama’s election undoubtedly represents a major sea change in American politics. The tone and approach are already very different from what passed under Bush, but remarkably, many questions remain unanswered regarding how his much-publicized ‘agenda for change’ will be transferred into policy. In no area is this truer than in the new administration’s approach to Ballistic Missile Defense. For Bush this issue was of both symbolic and substantive significance and as such how Obama addresses this policy legacy will be deeply scrutinized. Though remaining relatively quiet on the issue during the election campaign, Obama will need to move quickly in deciding what should happen to the proposed BMD sites in Central and Eastern Europe, whether the current financial climate necessitates cuts in funding, or indeed whether current technology justifies any further deployments at all. Underlying these decisions will be important choices regarding relations with Russia and Europe, and concerning the future direction of US national security policy. What to do about BMD, it seems, could be one of the first major challenges for the new President. The issue of Ballistic Missile Defense was propelled back to the centre stage of US national security policy by the Bush administration in 2001 following almost a decade of relative obscurity during the 1990s under President Clinton. By 2004 the first components of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system (GMD), which had begun development under Clinton, 
 1
 were being deployed in Alaska and California, and in early 2007 the Bush administration began discussions with Poland and the Czech Republic about hosting further US BMD facilities in Central and Eastern Europe. Both developments, beginning with the abrogation of the ABM treaty in late 2001, have been greeted with concern in Europe and have alarmed leaders in Moscow. By summer 2008, thanks largely to the Russia-Georgia war and improved US concession’s, the Polish government had agreed to host 10 US BMD interceptor missiles at the Redzikowo Air Force base, whilst the Czech Republic had agreed to host a European Midcourse Radar (EMR) in the Brdy military zone. At the end of Bush’s second term, however, these decisions had yet to be ratified by the Polish and Czech domestic legislatures. Despite this, after two terms in office, Bush’s legacy is one where the US has made significant progress in its BMD programmes; 24 interceptors have been deployed as part of the indigenous GMD system, a fleet of 18 BMD-capable Aegis warships are now on standby, a multitude of other projects are currently undergoing development1, whilst agreements about extending the system to Europe have also been reached.2 However, and despite receiving tacit NATO support at the April 2008 Bucharest summit, the European deployments remain a contentious and thorny issue in Europe, NATO and within the US Congress. Obama’s BMD thinking Barack Obama kept his cards relatively close to his chest regarding BMD during the 2008 Presidential election campaign, although the appointment of Joe Biden as Vice President seemed to suggest a more conciliatory approach to issues of arms control. An early insight of this new thinking was given in early July 2008 when candidate Obama responded to a series of missile tests by Iran. Whilst agreeing that the growing Iranian threat posed a significant danger that must be countermanded, Obama proposed and indeed favoured ‘direct and aggressive diplomacy’ and did not, as John McCain did, pronounce that the missile tests further highlighted the need to push ahead with a whole range of BMD programs, including the planned deployment in Europe.3 However, in a pre-election interview with Arms Control Today, Obama did stress that BMD could be a significant part of his plan to counter the threats with which America is and might be faced. Nevertheless, he was equally quick to caution that any missile defense must: 
 2
 …Be proven to work and be pursued as part of an integrated approach that uses the full range of non-proliferation policy tools in response to the full range of threats we face.4 Obama went on to say that any missile defense system proposed for Europe would need to have the support of American allies before it could be deployed. Perhaps more importantly he warned that America should not lose sight of the real 21st century threats during its pursuit of BMD – the biggest nuclear risk, he maintained, continued to be from terrorists and crude terrorist attacks and not from ballistic missiles.5 Nevertheless the Obama team was careful throughout the election campaign to talk rather generally and impalpably about BMD, taking particular care not to mention any specifics regarding the European deployments, upon which their election chances in states such as Pennsylvania, with large Eastern European populations, might be reliant.6 The first tangible, post-election demonstration of Obama’s BMD credentials came barely a day after his victory. Following his congratulatory phone call with the President-elect, Polish Prime Minister Lech Kaczynski publicly announced that Obama had assured him that the European missile defense project, instigated and formalized by the Bush administration, would continue. However, the Obama team quickly released a statement refuting this claim and reiterating its campaign pledge that the new administration would support deploying a missile defense system to Europe only when (and if) the technology proved to be workable.7 This quick and forthright response indicated that the new Obama administration remained determined to proceed with its chosen path, despite strong Republican and conservative opposition. Moreover, by pledging to deploy only if and when technology can be proven to work, the Obama team indirectly indicated a de-facto rejection of the spiral development acquisition strategy preferred by the Bush administration, which had allowed BMD components to be deployed before fully tested.8 This may provide an indication that future BMD deployments, both at home and abroad, will be much more conditioned and heavily scrutinized.9 Nevertheless, following a strongly partisan election, and what seems to be a relatively non-committal BMD policy, it remains hard to discern whether these pronouncements represent an early outline of the new administration’s policy preferences or a mixture of clever electioneering and early diplomatic maneuvering. 
 3
 Influences, questions and constraints One of the toughest questions facing the Obama administration as it takes office will be what to do about the proposed BMD deployments to Central and Eastern Europe. Though Obama’s stance seems to one of ‘wait until the technology is proven’, there are likely to be other shortterm factors that will guide and influence his thinking. The first and perhaps most significant influence will be Russia. This became all too apparent barely a day after Obama’s election victory as President Dmitri Medvedev announced that Russia would counter any American missile defense deployments in Central and Eastern Europe by deploying jamming facilities and short-range Iskander ballistic missiles in the Kaliningrad enclave between Poland and Lithuania. Ominously Medvedev went on to suggest that the continuation of American BMD plans for Europe would ‘destabilize the foundations of global order’.10 Although Obama chose not to respond to this thinly veiled challenge, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates referred to the remarks as ‘unhelpful, provocative’ and ‘hardly the welcome the new American administration deserves’.11 Obama’s policy on European BMD deployments will therefore be highly contingent on his strategic view of Russia, but also on the symbolic consequences for his international standing of potentially reversing diplomatic agreements already signed by the Bush administration in the face of threats from Moscow. How to deal with Russia over expanding American BMD plans to Europe has been further complicated by the recent Russia-Georgia war, which has lead foreign policy hawks and many Republican lawmakers to suggest that the system is now essential. Such statements however, reinforce Russian anxieties that the system is indeed aimed at them and not Iran. A second consequence of the war has been a distinct increase in the popularity of the system in Poland and the Czech Republic, which in part reflects a desire for stronger relations with Washington, making it more likely that BMD agreements will be ratified in these host countries. More problematically however is the symbolic repercussions of any cancellation decision. If Obama decides not to go ahead with the system he would need to address head on the accusations that this was a consequence of Russian pressure and that it therefore set a rather undesirable precedent for a possible Russian veto over US policy in that part of the world.12 The new President will need to tread carefully to avoid showing weakness in what is likely to be one of his first major international tests. On the other hand the domestic push to act strongly is likely 
 4
 to be counteracted by an opposite push from America’s allies in Europe to reduce tensions with Russia, and therefore to delay or even abandon the proposed European BMD deployments. Although European governments look far more willing to engage with the incoming administration than they had been with the previous one, recent evidence suggests that this conviviality does not extend to BMD plans. In fact Europeans may see an American compromise on BMD as quid pro-quo for a sustained diplomatic effort to deal with Iran or for a further military commitment to the war in Afghanistan.13 The BMD policy choices of the Obama administration are also likely to be substantially influenced by the exigencies of the current economic climate, and by the constraints imposed by domestic politics. Since regaining control of Congress in late 2006 Democrats have been quick to limit proposed spending for the European deployments, ensuring that construction work can only begin once agreements have been finalized with the Czech Republic and Poland, and delaying actual deployment until the interceptors have been proven to work (they are not due to begin testing until 2010).14 The Obama administration will therefore likely be constrained politically and economically in its flexibility over European and domestic BMD policy by a Democrat-controlled Congress keen to weather the current financial crises and limit future BMD appropriations and deployments. Moreover many of the lawmakers elected along with Obama in 2008 did so on the mood of anti-Iraq sentiment that saw the Republicans swept from power and are likely to be more a source of greater policy radicalism than the President himself. Consequently while the previous lawmakers accepted the indigenous component of the BMD system located in Alaska and California, and actually appropriated more than the Bush administration requested in the fiscal year 2009 budget, it is too early yet to tell the mood of the new Congress towards the issue of BMD.15 In any case both projects are likely to be affected by the current economic climate that will almost certainly pile downward pressure on the already heavily inflated defence budget. $10bn plus per annum on BMD is a likely target for these cuts.16 The indigenous GMD programme that has already been established is also likely to be influenced by both the structural legacy of the Bush years, and by the continued immaturity of current technology. Although Obama’s Presidential campaign owes little political debt to large defense contractors, the necessity of issuing contracts and planning research and development years in advance means that the new administration will struggle, at least in the short run, to 
 5
 radically alter the domestic BMD programme initiated by the Bush administration.17 This seemingly unstoppable ability of BMD funding to continue relatively unabated despite its performance or perceived necessity, is a phenomenon that has been likened by Mark Thompson to the ‘escape velocity’ of a missile soaring into the skies.18 This trend towards relative continuity will undoubtedly be reinforced by the decision to keep pro-BMD Robert Gates at the Pentagon. That said it is unlikely that Gates will serve a full term as Defence Secretary. Technologically however it still remains unclear as to what standard many of the BMD components currently deployed by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) have been tested to, or whether the system is in fact ‘operational’. The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system, which the Bush administration began deploying in 2004, is still undergoing developmental and operational testing (as of January 2009 8 of 14 tests since 1999 have been successful), whilst a whole host of other projects have failed to reach fruition.19 An initial priority for the Obama administration therefore might simply be in trying to get the systems already deployed to prove either viable or workable. Options So what options might the new administration actually have once its original approach and outlook has been countered by the realities of politics and current circumstances? Although Russian posturing has undoubtedly made things difficult, it should not be a problem for President Obama to maintain his campaign pledge of waiting until technology is proven before deployment. This will not only please his natural constituency in the Democrat-controlled Congress, but also stave off a debate with Russia, and in effect buy time for a more calculated decision in the future. Moreover this type of approach is likely to reassure European allies, lessen tension in Europe and perhaps ensure broader support in other US foreign policy objectives such as in Afghanistan or towards Iran. Obama may also be best served pursuing a similar policy with regards to the indigenous GMD system, which although receiving wider support, still remains essentially unproven. What is more, both options would also take into account the pressures of the current economic environment. A continued policy of research, development and testing before deployment would seem the most prudent way in which to progress in both cases. 
 6
 The second option, and one that was conspicuously ignored by the Bush administration, is to cooperate with the Russians towards the possibility of a joint defence, or as is more likely, joint radar monitoring. The Russians have been proposing these types of deals since the end of the Cold War, and perhaps this could be the option that defuses the current standoff, meets the underlying intentions of the Euro-BMD project, whilst advancing a new Obama foreign policy agenda based on consultation and cooperation. The use of the proposed Russian radars in Armavir and Qabala (Armenia & Azerbaijan) not only makes strategic and military sense but is also likely to help enlist Moscow’s support in other US foreign policy goals. An additional corollary to this agreement might be to further ‘NATO-ize’ the US’s European BMD plans, focusing more on theatre-based missile threats to which all are subjected, and perhaps allowing a greater role for the NATO-Russia council in running European theatre BMD policy. However, it should be noted that although Russia has been proposing radar cooperation for nearly two years, this type of deal is far from guaranteed, especially with the Kremlin keen to milk the current climate for domestic rhetorical points. The retention of Robert Gates, who has consistently refused to negotiate on the European deployments, as Secretary for Defense, also questions to efficacy of this option. Even more of an obstacle, however, may be relations with a Moscow leadership which seems determined by its rhetoric and posturing to make it more difficult for Obama to show the flexibility on this subject that a more dispassionate approach would suggest was desirable. The last option would involve simply delaying the European deployment until the threat from Iran or another potentially hostile Middle Eastern state has actually materialized. Again this approach would seem to combine the benefits of reducing tensions with Russia, allowing the time to develop and test a variety of different technologies, whilst continuing to monitor developments and missile threats from a variety of hostile states. Moreover, this ‘wait and see’ policy might be bolstered by a more substantial focus on theatre missile defense systems and improving the possibilities of BMD from the sea.20 Both of these options would have the advantage of not posing a direct threat to the Russian strategic deterrent and therefore avoiding a potential diplomatic showdown. Accordingly the Obama administration would be dealing with the threats as they presently stand, and not with what they might be like in the future. The prospect of a more focused approach to Iran and a return to direct diplomacy with a post Ahmadinejad regime also increases the likelihood of this option. A return to diplomacy in 
 7
 general would also help in other ways; getting Russia to support US policy towards Iran for example would also be a way of preventing the BMD deployments that it currently opposes. It seems most likely that Ballistic Missile Defense will remain a significant research and development programme under the Obama administration - there are simply too many factors that will conspire to continue driving it forward. It is therefore highly unlikely that the new administration will repeat the Safeguard decision of 197621, and choose to cancel or close the GMD system that has been deployed by the Bush administration. Indicative of this likely permanence is the new $38.5m headquarters currently being built to house the MDA just 10 miles south of the Pentagon.22 Despite this we are unlikely to see a direct continuation of the policies and thinking adopted by the Bush administration. BMD policy during the Obama administration is likely to be re-prioritized towards advancing theatre-level systems, expanding missile defense and security cooperation, and refining the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system already deployed. Regardless of financial pressures, the retention of Robert Gates, along with a large constituency of defense contractors and Republican supporters, will likely mean that various indigenous and theatre BMD programmes will be relatively hard to curtail. Much less certainty however revolves around the future of the proposed European deployment, and it is perhaps here that the greatest latitude for maneuver might seem to exist. Whether President Obama is able to stick with his campaign pledge to deploy BMD assets only when technologically proven and with allied support will depend a great deal on how he handles Russia in what is likely to be one of the first big international tests of his Presidency. The summit for the 60th anniversary of NATO in April 2009 will be the first test of what the new President’s policy will be on this important issue. Prudent options to square this circle exist, but as with most things perhaps only time will tell whether the new administration can overcome the multitude of different factors that underpin and shape the US drive for ballistic missile defense. One thing that is certain, however, is that the new President approaches this question with much less ideological zeal than his predecessor. Unlike Bush he is not a believer in ‘faith based’ missile defense and the awareness that any decision he takes on this subject will have security, political and symbolic consequences, will mean that the effectiveness of the systems will have new baring in the debate. 
 8
 3660 (3202) words 




























































 1 
Further information on the different projects currently being developed can be found on the 
Missile Defense Agency, “Ballistic Missile Defense System” (As of August 2008), Michael Cooper, “US candidates use Iran’s missile test as a chance for a foreign policy debate”, 
Barack Obama, “Arms Control Today 2008 Presidential Q & A: President-elect Barack Ibid
 Pavel Podvig, “Barack Obama’s missile defense challenge”, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Walter Pincus, “Poland wont lobby Obama on missile defense”, The Washington Post, 20th 
The spiral acquisition strategy pursued by the Bush administration from 2002 mandated that MDA’s website: www.mda.mil
 2 http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/bmds.pdf
 3 The New York Times, 10th July 2008
 4 Obama”, Arms Control Today, December 2008
 5 6 11th November 2008
 7 November 2008
 8 technology should be deployed in 2-year blocks in order to give the US an incremental BMD capability. This strategy therefore allows for testing of components when they are deployed, rather than before. Consequently components can be depoyed before they have been fully tested. For more on this see Victoria Samson “Spiraling out of control” Defense & Security Analysis 24: 2 (2008)
 9 Wade Boese, “Anti-missile systems uncertainty grows”, Arms Control Today, December 2008
 Jeffrey Taylor, “Medvedev spoils the party”, The Atlantic Online, 14th November 2008 Wade Boese, “Anti-missile systems uncertainty grows”, Arms Control Today, December 2008
 Editorial, “Obama’s missile gap”, Los Angeles Times, 14th November 2008
 Thom Shanker & Helene Cooper, “A new chapter: Europe is ready to work with Obama”, The Eric Lipton, “Some Democrats urge delay in building a US missile defense system in Europe”, 10 http://www.theatlantic.com/
 11 12 13 New York Times, 3rd January 2009
 14 The New York Times, 20th August 2008 
 
 9
 



































































































































































































 15 Wade Boese, “Hill adjusts Bush’s proposed military spending”, Arms Control Today, Editorial, “Obama’s missile gap”, Los Angeles Times, 14th November 2008
 See for example George Monbiot, “The US missile defense system is the magic pudding that Johann Hari, “Obama’s chance to end the fantasy that is Star Wars”, The Independent, 13th November 2008
 16 17 will never run out”, The Guardian, 19th August 2008
 18 November 2008 & Mark Thompson, “Why Obama will continue Star Wars”, TIME, 16th November 2008
 19 Missile Defense Agency, “Fact Sheet: Ballistic Missile Defense flight test record”, (updated 12th December 2008), Accessed 7th January 2009. http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/testrecord.pdf & Centre for Defense Information, “Missile Defense Update 7th Jan 2009”, Accessed 7th January 2009. http://www.cdi.org/ 
 20 For more on this see Daryl Kimball “What should President Obama do about missile The Safeguard missile defense system was closed in 1976, having been open barely 3 months, defense?” The Washington Times, 30th November 2008
 21 due to political and economic pressure and concerns about its effectiveness. For more on Safeguard and other previous BMD programs see Richard Burns & Lester Brune, “The quest for missile defenses, 1944-2003”, (2003) 
 22 Mark Thompson, “Why Obama will continue Star Wars”, TIME, 16th November 2008
 
 10