Re-evaluating the US troop surge in Iraq more

This article was downloaded by: [University of Warwick] On: 25 July 2011, At: 03:10 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Defence Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdef20 Short‐Term Tactical Gains and Long‐Term Strategic Problems: The Paradox of the US Troop Surge in Iraq David Hastings Dunn & Andrew Futter a b a b University of Birmingham University of Birmingham Available online: 28 May 2010 To cite this article: David Hastings Dunn & Andrew Futter (2010): Short‐Term Tactical Gains and Long‐Term Strategic Problems: The Paradox of the US Troop Surge in Iraq, Defence Studies, 10:01-02, 195-214 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14702430903377977 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/ terms-and-conditions This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. 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Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 03:10 25 July 2011 ARTICLE Short-Term Tactical Gains and LongTerm Strategic Problems: The Paradox of the US Troop Surge in Iraq Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 03:10 25 July 2011 D A V I D H AS TI NGS D UNN AND ANDREW FUTTE R d.h.dunn@bham.ac.uk DavidDunn 000000March-June 1-2 10 Taylor and Francis 2010 & (print)/1743-9698 Original Article 1470-2436Francis Defence Studies 2010 10.1080/14702430903377977 (online) FDEF_A_437975.sgm As it entered its sixth year, many commentators have begun to suggest that the war in Iraq is at last moving in the right direction. In particular they are quick to point out the marked reduction in violence since the seeming nadir in 2006–2007, and also to the progress that has been made towards establishing a democratic basis in the country. Conventional wisdom about the recent developments in Iraq holds that the American troop Surge of 2007 and 2008, though certainly a gamble, has been a key component of this success. Not only has it allowed for the transfer of power and responsibility to Iraqis themselves, it has also allowed for a prompt but honorable staged troop withdrawal from Iraq and for a greater concentration on the more accepted conflict in Afghanistan. Consequently many now view Iraq as the war that has been won. Iraq is unquestionably a more stable and secure country than it was even 12 months ago; coalition troops are no longer forced to remain behind heavily defended compounds for most of the day, there are signs of normality returning to commercial life in the countries’ major cities, and in January 2009 Iraq successful held a spate of local provincial elections. Part of the reason for this is almost certainly the troop Surge and the widespread change in coalition counterinsurgency strategy that began in early 2007. However a closer look reveals that numerous other factors were already pushing Iraq towards a more stable path at least in the short term, without Dr David Hastings Dunn is Reader in International Politics at the University of Birmingham. Andrew Futter is a Doctoral Researcher at the University of Birmingham completing his doctorate on the US Ballistic Missile Debate. Defence Studies, Vol. 10, Nos. 1–2 (March–June 2010), pp. 195–214 ISSN 1470-2436 http://www.informaworld.com DOI: 10.1080/14702430903377977 © 2010 Taylor & Francis 196 D E F E NC E S TUD IE S which the troop Surge may have been neither politically or strategically possible. The US engagement with these indigenous developments coupled with the Surge worked well tactically in creating the short-term breathing space to attempt the longer term goals of political consolidation and creating the foundations for development. However as this is written, and as the coalition forces begin their gradual withdrawal, many of these strategic goals have not been met. Ironically it seems that many of the dynamics and tactics that created the ephemeral political breathing space and allowed for coalition troop withdrawals, are also the ones that make long-term security and stability less likely. The first aim of this article is to show that the troop Surge has been only one of several important dynamics that have created the current period of relative stability and security in Iraq. Perhaps the key development and determinant of the recent security gains can be traced back to the split between Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the tribal Sunni inSurgency (The ‘Awakening’) that began in 2005, which when combined with ability of local commanders on the ground to take advantage of this potential split undoubtedly provided the foundation of the short-term peace currently experienced. These developments also made the troop Surge and new counterinSurgency plan presided over and begun by General David Petraeus in early 2007 both politically and strategically possible. By 2008 the extra troops and change in strategy had brought relative peace to Iraq and a more confident Iraqi President Nouri al-Maliki felt able to confront the dominance of the Mahdi Army in the south and return control to the provincial government. Faced with an increased troop presence and feeling of stability the Madhi Army and Iran choose to withdraw from the fight temporarily. It is conceivable therefore that the Sunni awakening would not have happened without Al-Qaeda and the intuition of local commanders, the Surge without the ‘Awakening’, and the Mahdi Army ceasefire without either. The second aim of this article is to show how many of the dynamics that have allowed for the current lull in violence are also antithetical to the prospects of long-term security and stability in Iraq. First, the tribal strategy employed by coalition forces to weaken Al-Qaeda and pacify Iraq’s Sunni minority has created two more long-term problems for the central government; whether the Shi’ite-dominated central government is able to forge links with Sunni tribal leaders who enjoyed so much autonomy under coalition forces, and whether the ‘Sons of Iraq’ can be either found jobs or integrated into the Iraqi security forces (ISF). Second, as coalition troops leave, and as well dealing with Iraq’s Sunnis, the infant central government and the largely untested and now unaided ISF Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 03:10 25 July 2011 P ARADOX OF THE U S T R OOP S U R GE I N I R A Q 197 Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 03:10 25 July 2011 face several key structural challenges in the near future including prisoner release, returning refugees, falling oil prices, a crumbling infrastructure and endemic crime and corruption. The hasty withdrawal of coalition troops makes this challenge that much harder. Last, and linked irrevocably to the last two points, is whether the Shi’ite Madhi Army and Iran decide that as troops leave and the central government struggles the time is now more propitious to launch a bid for power and control in Iraq’s south. If these issues are not dealt with Iraq could be on the way to a bloody civil war. The American troop Surge is best described therefore as one of several factors that came together to bequeath the current relatively stability and security now experienced in most parts of Iraq. But most importantly the Surge has only achieved the tactical goals of improving short-term security and allowing for phased troop withdrawal and not the key strategic and long-term goal of political breakthrough to create the foundations for longterm stability. Fundamentally these short-term considerations are at the heart of the long-term issues that will continue to make a stable and secure Iraq a difficult and perhaps distant goal. Indigenous Developments and Ephemeral Tactical Successes: How Stability was Achieved in Iraq It is hard to deny that by late 2005 coalition forces were on the verge of ‘losing Iraq’; the death toll of forces and Iraqi citizens was mounting alarmingly, sectarian violence and an internecine civil war were spiraling out of control, and coalition troops, Iraqi security forces and the interim government were being forced to spend more and more time in heavily fortified bases. By early 2009 however provincial elections had been held around Iraq without any major problems, violence and crime was down to levels similar to that experienced in the many parts of the developed world, AlQaeda in Iraq seemed to be in decline, while the control of and threat from both Sunni insurgents and Shi’ite militias had substantially rescinded. As a consequence coalition troops began a staged withdraw from Iraq and the gradual handover of more and more power and responsibility to the central government in 2009, and the Iraqi state began preparing for national elections in January 2010. The Sunni Awakening The genesis of the current period of relative stability and security in Iraq can probably be traced back to the gradual split that had emerged between the tribal Sunni insurgency and the jihadists of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) by early 198 D E F E NC E S TUD IE S 2005. Although Iraq’s Sunni communities, based largely in Baghdad and in the province of al-Anbar, had entered into something of a marriage of convenience with Al-Qaeda fighters since the invasion of 2003 as both parties strove to force coalition forces out of Iraq, and to restore the minority Sunnis back to power, this began to fragment in 2005 as divergence in longterm visions for Iraq began to outweigh the perceived benefits of cooperating against coalition forces, consequently the Sunnis began to change sides.1 The split and gradual worsening of relations between AQI and the Sunni tribal leaders that began around 2005 can be put down to three central factors that all emanated from the desire of AQI to dominate the Sunni tribes. The first reason, and perhaps the key factor that instigated the split was that AQI rigorously tried to assimilate itself into local society by marrying its members into prominent local families, and while this was an established jihadist practice, this strategy ran counter to long-established tribal customs that forbade marrying off the tribes’ women to anyone from outside the larger tribal confederation. Consequently AQI’s strategy was fiercely resisted by the locals, which in turn were then subjected to violence and intimidation from AQI. The second key reason was that AQI tried to move in and take control of the tribes’ involvement in black market trading and in other lucrative criminal rackets – again this was fiercely resisted, and again AQI used violence and intimidation in an attempt to force the tribes to bow to its influence. Last, in addition to trying to assimilate into the Sunni tribes and trying to take control of resources and the black economy, AQI began trying to force its own fundamentalist social and political agenda on the people of alAnbar. Again this was resisted and again AQI resorted to high-handed tactics and violence in order to achieve its goals.2 By 2005 therefore tensions were becoming rife between the two principle entities in the Sunni insurgency, and local opinion was beginning to shift against AQI. The rift that began in 2005 between the parties was then compounded in 2006 by two interlinked developments. The first was AQI’s bombing of the al-Askariyya (‘Golden’) Mosque in Samarra on 22 February 2006 that led basically led to all-out sectarian civil war in Iraq, and caused Sunni tribal leaders in al-Anbar to realize that although AQI could provoke conflict and inflict major damage it also highlighted the fact that they could not protect the populace – moreover the ensuing civil war showed that contrary to expectations Sunnis were not likely to win a protracted conflict. Consequently the value of the alliance waned, as ordinary Sunnis became the victims of attacks that AQI had instigated, gradually Sunnis began to realize Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 03:10 25 July 2011 P ARADOX OF THE U S T R OOP S U R GE I N I R A Q 199 that the only entity in Iraq that could protect them was the coalition forces. But the final nail in the coffin was probably AQI’s announcement in October 2006 that it intended to found and dominate a new ‘Islamic State of Iraq’ (ISI), which further angered the Sunni tribes as they recoiled at yet another attempt by AQI to establish dominance over local Iraqis.3 The second major factor, and the one that arguably lead to the Sunni insurgents transferring their loyalties from AQI to coalition forces was the ability, foresight and intuition of various coalition commanders on the ground to recognize this split and work to exploit this rift in the inSurgency. After the invasion coalition forces had been instructed to pursue a topdown democracy strategy and a ‘capture and kill’ inSurgency policy that naturally meant that the importance of local tribal leaders and cultural orders were eschewed. By 2005–6 however experienced on the ground commanders began to realize that this policy simply was not working, forces could not kill their way to victory in Iraq because every time an enemy fighter was killed or captured another would take their place. Moreover the general policy was becoming something of a recruiting aid for the insurgency.4 Some local coalition commanders in al-Anbar had been tying to work with local tribal leaders since 2004, but this had proved virtually impossible until Al-Qaeda’s grand plans for Iraq began to split the Sunni-AQI alliance. Starting in 2005 however as links began to weaken between the Sunnis and AQI, coalition commanders began to ignore the top-down approach and instead began to enact a different approach; more in tune with classical counterinSurgency theory. Instead of contracting out reconstruction projects and aid projects to foreign firms or the central government, coalition forces began sending money through local Sunni tribal leaders – substituting the original policy of competition and fairness for direct funding and parochialism. Additionally as trust began to grow between the Sunni leaders and coalition forces, US troops authorized, funded and armed Sunni militias to look after their own local security concerns. Marine Brigadier General John Allen even began courting exiled leaders living in Jordan, Syria and elsewhere abroad to come back and look after their villages and towns.5 Although relying on the tribes to provide for their own security was not a new phenomenon – both the British in the 1920s and Saddam Hussein during the 1980s and 1990s had done the same – it was to prove very effective, as by 2006 large numbers of Sunni tribes, who now tended to view coalition forces as much less of a long term threat than Al-Qaeda, particularly as pressure mounted for troops to withdraw in summer 2006, switched allegiances.6 This switching of allegiances was to become know as the Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 03:10 25 July 2011 200 D E F E NC E S TUD IE S ‘Sunni Awakening’, and would mark the beginning of a substantial improvement in the security and stability of western Iraq and parts of Baghdad, and represented a major defeat for AQI. The US Troop Surge and Change of COIN strategy Although violence was on the way down in al-Anbar by 2006 thanks largely to the ‘Sunni Awakening’, political pressure was mounting on coalition leaders to get the troops out of Iraq. As Democrats swept back to power in the US congress and Robert Gates replaced Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, and as the Iraqi Survey Group released its own report into what should happen in Iraq, President George W. Bush unveiled a new strategy that seemed neither popular nor particularly prudent. The idea of a troop Surge, which began outside the mainstream US military was derided by many, but when combined with a change in counterinSurgency tactics, allowed coalition forces to cement and build on the gains that had been made in al-Anbar by turning all their attention to Baghdad. The Surge idea was created outside the normal active military hierarchy and was not received well by the Joint Chiefs of Staff who seemed vehemently against sending any more troops to Iraq. Instead the intellectual drive came from former vice chief of staff to the Army General John M. ‘Jack’ Keane and other retired army officers combined with academics at the right-wing American Enterprise Institute.7 The plan, which Bush probably subscribed to in the hope of still salvaging something from the mess in Iraq, was to introduce a large number of troops into the Baghdad area to enforce security and clear out the militias and criminal gangs. The goal was twofold; first to provide the breathing space to attempt to solve Iraq’s crippling political problems and to put in place a working system of government, while the second was to create the conditions for coalition troops to withdraw. The President described the overall objective as establishing a ‘unified, democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the War on Terror’. The major element of the strategy was a change in focus for the US military ‘to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security’.8 The plan that Bush announced on 10 January 2007 mandated sending an additional 21,500 combat troops to Iraq, along with other auxiliary outfits, and extended the tour length of thousands more US troops. But the key factor, and the one almost always overlooked in the conventional wisdom of the Surge, was that the extra troops would be accompanied by a new counterinsurgency doctrine that had just recently been completed by Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 03:10 25 July 2011 P ARADOX OF THE U S T R OOP S U R GE I N I R A Q 201 Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 03:10 25 July 2011 Lieutenant General David Petreaus at the US Army training and education centre at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Petraeus, who would take charge of coalition operations in Iraq on 10 February 2007, and who had been working on the new COIN manual since 2005, suggested that the US handling of the war in Iraq so far was dreadful. Instead of the kill and capture strategy which had been used since things had unexpectedly got out of hand in summer 2003, he advocated returning to a more classical counterinSurgency strategy – such as had been used by some commanders in al-Anbar – and making the safety of the Iraqi population the key goal of strategy. Moreover he suggested building on the successes that had been obtaining in al-Anbar by working with a deferring more responsibility to local leaders and tribes. Petraeus also argued that the US simply did not currently have enough troops in Iraq to do this – consequently either the entire US strategy in Iraq needed to change or more troops were needed.9 Initially as the additional US troops flooded the streets of Baghdad the death toll actually rose, with March 2007 being one of the worst months in the entire war for US troop casualties, and after three months US forces still only controlled around a third of the capital. However by the time General Petraeus presented his report on the situation in Iraq to Congress in September 2007 he declared that the military objectives contained in the Surge were being met – moreover he could now point to many instances where Iraqis were policing their own communities. By mid 2008 violence was down substantially and during July 2008 only 13 US soldiers were killed – the lowest number since early 2004. One key impact of the Surge was that Nouri al-Maliki, though now in a far more secure position and now able to control more of Baghdad, also began feeling pressure from the US to act against the Shi’ite militias operating and controlling the south. Consequently and before coalition troops began their withdrawal, al-Maliki felt secure enough to launch a major operation against many of his former allies in the south around Basra province. The Madhi Army Ceasefire Despite the relative peace and stability now being enjoyed throughout Sunni al-Anbar, and the newfound control now exercised by the Iraqi authorities and coalition forces in Baghdad, the Iranian-backed Shi’ite Madhi Army militia still maintained control of southern Iraq around Basra province at the expense of the local authorities in 2008. Although remaining relatively peaceful and quiescent during the 2003 invasion, it did not take long for things to deteriorate in southern Iraq, and by late 2003 local Iranian-backed militias seemed to be in control of the city. By 2004 202 D E F E NC E S TUD IE S coalition forces were largely confined to barracks and the Mahdi Army militias had expanded their control of the area, running the lucrative smuggling and crime networks, and had imposed strict Islamic law on the populace.10 Basra City in particular began to fall under the sway of strict Islamic law, where women were threatened for wearing make-up; prominent intellectuals and figures were kidnapped and murdered; sectarian killings became rife, and general Western or secular practices became outlawed.11 This influence was solidified in 2005 as the new Iraqi nation went to the polls, and despite an unsuccessful British-led operation to purge the security forces and tackle the militias in 2006, even by early 2008 the situation looked dire.12 However by early 2008 sufficient security gains had been made by the Surge troops in Baghdad to provide Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki with the confidence to finally sort out the south and return control to the Iraqi authorities. Maliki was also conscious of the forthcoming elections, and was also coming under more and more pressure from the coalition leadership to ‘pull his weight’. Consequently on 25 March 2008 al-Maliki began what became known as the ‘Battle of Basra’. This operation, named ‘Charge of the Knights’, was designed to rid the southern city of the Mahdi Army and to restore the power of the local governorate.13 The 30,000 troops met with fierce resistance from the well-entrenched Mahdi Army and initially stalled. However, the result was the declaration of a ceasefire signed in Iran on 31 March, just six days into the battle, in which Muqtada al-Sadr withdrew his fighters from the streets, his hold on the city now broken, and many of his supporters, as well as many insurgents, retreated across the border to Iran. The fighting was followed by an expansive clear-out operation by the Iraqi forces in order to take control of the lawless districts of the city. By 24 April Iraqi security forces claimed to be in full control of the city, and the Mahdi Army’s death squads, which had previously thoroughly penetrated the police, unleashed murder and terror on the population and as such was a challenge to the central authority of Baghdad were reported to have largely left Basra.14 The removal of these elements cleared the way for political, economic and civic reconstruction in the south. The result of the operation was perhaps less militarily decisive than the Maliki government had planned but significantly it marked the point at which Iraqi political parties began to move away from the idea of militiabased security towards integration in the political process. Indicative of this was a surprise announcement on 13 June 2008 by Sadr that most of the Mahdi Army would now work towards more peaceful civic activities.15 Another direct consequence of the ‘Battle for Basra’ was the increase in popularity of the secular Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a fact that Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 03:10 25 July 2011 P ARADOX OF THE U S T R OOP S U R GE I N I R A Q 203 Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 03:10 25 July 2011 undoubtedly contributed to his success in the 31 January 2009 local elections, and that will help provide him with support in his efforts to reform and rebuild the country.16 While al-Maliki’s success in the elections was widely seen as a defeat for Iran,17 it also precipitated a split in Sadr’s organization with those wanting a closer relationship with Iran keen to break from the Iraqi cleric.18 By early 2009 Iraq seemed to be a changed society, and although being far from perfect in many ways, did seem to be moving inexorably in the right direction. These ephemeral security gains were not primarily due to the US troop Surge that began in early 2007, but instead to a mixture of dynamics that unfolded in something of a linear fashion. The catalyst was probably Al-Qaeda’s designs on greater power and control over the Sunni insurgency in western Iraq, which when combined with a maturing and evolving US approach towards the Sunni tribes by American commanders on the ground, set the scene for the all-important Sunni Awakening. Without the ‘Awakening’ and the relative peace and stability in western Iraq the US probably would not have launched the troop Surge into Baghdad – however the real key to the Surge was not the numbers but the widespread change in COIN strategy that Petraeus issued as he took control in Iraq. Lastly these gains in Baghdad and al-Anbar, plus other political considerations laid the foundation for the Iraqi Security Forces to regain control in the south and extinguish the power, however temporarily, of the Madhi Army. Short-Term Thinking and False Optimism: Continuing Challenges for Iraq However much conditions in Iraq may appear to have improved over the last 18 months, there are still a multitude of reasons to suggest that some of the country’s biggest challenges are yet to come. Moreover many of these future challenges have direct connections with the predominantly shortterm tactics the have led in no uncertain way to the current downturn in violence and upturn in security and stability in Iraq. As this section will show, there are three major sets of challenges for Iraq still to face. First there will be the issue of how to integrate the Sunni tribal leaders and the much acclaimed ‘Sons of Iraq’ back into a secular state led by a Shi’ite central government, after being treated ostensibly as a separate entity by coalition forces over the last few years. Second, and on top of reintegrating these Sunni tribes, there is the issue of whether the central Iraqi government will be able to deal with the numerous structural challenges that it will have to face in the foreseeable 204 D E F E NC E S TUD IE S future, and in particular whether the Iraqi Security Forces are able to prove themselves capable as coalition troops depart, fully by 31 December 2011. Last and linked into the previous two, there is the issue of what Iran and the Mahdi Army might do if they feel the time has become more propitious to relaunch a bid for power as coalition troops leave and the central government’s credibility and authority perhaps begins to erode. If these things happen Iraq could descend into a civil war reminiscent of that which led to the Surge in the first place. The Tribal Strategy and the Future Sunni Challenge Perhaps the first key challenge as troops depart will be how the predominantly Shi’ite Iraqi government can reintroduce links with the Sunni tribal leaders who received such autonomy from the central government under the ‘tribal strategy’ pursued by the coalition forces since early 2007. As mentioned earlier, the tribal strategy granted major powers to local Sunni leaders – in predominantly Sunni al-Anbar – to look after their own affairs, allowed them to appropriate reconstruction moneys as they pleased, and turn a blind eye to local black market activities. As part of this strategy coalition forces also allowed local Sunnis to act on their own initiative, paying very little attention to the legislation and instructions emanating from the central government in Baghdad. Additionally the coalition also paid, armed and trained private tribal armies – known as the ‘Sons of Iraq’. However, and while this approach undoubtedly represented a tactical success, the realpolitik underpinnings of the decision to make deals with former Sunni insurgents – often against the will of the Shi’ite central government – looks set to cause numerous problems in the future. The main objective of this policy was to buy the time and security necessary to advance the political process – this arguably has not advanced as far as had been hoped. Instead the US has empowered numerous groups that will almost certainly mean less national cohesion in the long run.19 The tribal strategy was a means to achieve two strategic ends; fighting and defeating Al-Qaeda in Iraq and buying time to move ahead with the political process to allow for the withdrawal of coalition troops, but is antithetical to another, the long-term creation of a stable, unified and democratic Iraqi state. As Austin Long points out ‘the tribe and modern bureaucratic state are inherently in tension … attempting to use the former to secure the latter is at best a stop-gap measure. At worst, it sows the seeds of future state failure.’20 The tribal strategy meant that that sectarian and anti-US violence did not worsen and that Al-Qaeda would continue to struggle, but will also meant putting democratization and national reconciliation on hold.21 Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 03:10 25 July 2011 P ARADOX OF THE U S T R OOP S U R GE I N I R A Q 205 An integral part of the tribal strategy was the recruitment of former Sunni insurgents into the organization that the Iraqis called the Awakening and the US called the Sons of Iraq. This scheme relied on the US paying these individuals to turn and fight against the foreign infiltrated Al-Qaeda operations in Iraq. The most noticeable area where this had an impact was in the largely Sunni al-Anbar province – previously the most violent region of Iraq – but its impact was also felt on a national scale. As part of its efforts to disengage from Iraq, however, the US has recently announced its plans to disband the Sons of Iraq and to see this militia integrated into the regular Iraqi Army and Police Force. The militiamen have been promised jobs in the Army or Police or in other government departments as part of the new Iraq. But to date only 10,000 of the 94,000 Sunni militiamen have been turned over to the control of the Iraqi military, and despite promises from both the US Army and the Iraqi government only 5,000 Awakening members, just over 5 percent, have been given permanent jobs in the Iraqi security forces.22 There are several reasons for this delay. First, there is a still a high degree of suspicion of the Sunni militiamen, many of whom are former fighters against the American and Iraqi armies. Second, the decrease in the price of oil has hit the Shi’ite-led Iraqi government’s revenues to such an extent that it is having difficulties paying its existing employees and decreasing considerably its appetite for taking on 100,000 new public servants.23 Prime Minister al-Maliki’s promise to bring 20 percent of them into the police and to give the other 80 percent jobs in other government departments has failed to happen. So far 3,000 jobs have been promised by the Health Ministry, 10,000 by the Education Ministry, and 500 by the Oil Ministry, but this is far short of the numbers needed to prevent the former insurgents falling back into unemployment and poverty.24 The fear of many observers is that without jobs or money many of these former fighters may be rerecruited into Al-Qaeda or will find alternative occupations in the many criminal organizations in Iraq. No longer being part of the solution they will once again become part of the problem of lawlessness, corruption, instability and viole. While more than 500 Awakening militiamen died fighting Al-Qaeda on behalf of the Americans there is now a sense of abandonment and betrayal among many of them who feel let down by the Shi’ite government for what they have done and what they could still do for the new Iraq if given the chance to so. Desertions from the Awaking militias are now as high as 50 percent in some regions and the militiaman have not been paid for three months. The meager salary of only $130 a month, ‘not enough for cigarettes’, is also a source of resentment.25 If suitable roles are not found for Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 03:10 25 July 2011 206 D E F E NC E S TUD I E S Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 03:10 25 July 2011 these disillusioned fighters, and the Awakening militias are effectively stood down once their American payments stop, it is a decision which may be looked at in hindsight as analogous to the disbandment of the Iraq Army in May 2003, a decision widely viewed as having hastened the descent into insurgency in Iraq. Not only might this result be viewed as a missed opportunity it could also be seen as having vindicated the critics of the Awakening strategy in its entirety. From its inception some analysts argued that aiding and arming the Sunnis would work against national level accommodations by politicizing their sectarian identity, and that in accepting American aid and arms the Sunni militias were also preparing to defend themselves should the US Army no longer be there to do so.26 Thus the long-term effect of this policy could also be a more bloody interethnic conflict. The fact that during the Surge period the number of arms caches discovered rose sharply can also be interpreted two ways. While their capture is good news it may also indicate that their actual number has been on the increase preparing for renewed interethnic conflict once the Americans leave. The Key Lynchpin: Structural Challenges for the Iraqi Government and Security Forces How to re-accommodate the Sunni tribal leaders and the ‘Sons of Iraq’ with a secular Shi’ite lead central government in Baghdad is just the first problem facing political leaders, and in particular the Iraqi security forces, as coalition troops began their phased withdrawal and more responsibility is handed over. The infant institutions will also have to contend with the impact of widespread prisoner release from coalition jails, the return of millions of refugees to a country which has been effectively ethnically cleansed, the continued problem of crime and corruption, while also needing to move expeditiously ahead with rebuilding Iraq’s tattered infrastructure upon which the agreement of a new oil law is absolutely fundamental. The Iraqi Army and Police are much larger, better equipped and more proficient than they ever have been. Even acknowledging that, however, they are also no substitute for coalition forces and remain far from a dependable force. In 2007 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was persuaded by the Americans to purge well over half the brigade and battalion commanders of each organization in the Baghdad area. By some estimates at least another two further rounds of purges may be necessary to ensure the effective and loyal command of Iraq forces.27 While progress has been made there remain well founded concerns about the expanded Iraqi Police and Army that are still widely regarded as still too faction ridden, ill-disciplined P ARADOX OF THE U S T R OOP S U R GE I N I R A Q 207 and lacking in universal legitimacy to tackle the sectarian violence which still racks Iraq. A report by the American think-tank Center for Strategic and International Studies, euphemistically described them as ‘still very much a work in progress’.28 While the loyalty of the Iraqi security forces to the central government in Baghdad remains an issue, so too does their professionalism and willingness to tackle the insurgents. Since the new mandate for US Armed Forces was established with the Status of Forces Agreement that came into effect on 1 January 2009, the US forces have operated on the basis of Iraqi primacy and have gradually begun to withdraw to large remote central garrisons. As a result there have been reports of Iraqi police and army units being reluctant to tackle difficult and dangerous situations or to follow up arrest warrants without the support of either US Army units or American close air support. According to one Iraqi observer, ‘the Iraqi security forces have refused to do anything in our area … we have many arrest warrants against people, but because the Americans withdrew from our area the Iraqis are afraid to go after them without air support. We will face a disaster.’29 One of the first tests for the Iraqi Army and Police will be the how they cope with the dismantling and emptying of the sizable prison camps as coalition forces begin to depart the country. Many of these establishments, such as the infamous Camp Bucca near the Kuwaiti border, had been used to house suspected insurgents, extremists and terrorists throughout the occupation of Iraq. The camps had remained extremely controversial during this period, due in part to their tendency to hold inmates without charge or due process, and because they seemed also to provide a breeding ground for the recruitment of disenchanted and alienated Iraqis, often guilty of minor crimes, to extremist and insurgent movements. Since April 2003 coalition forces detained some 100,000 suspected insurgents in these prisons, 26,000 alone at Camp Bucca, and now due to amnesties offered by the Iraqi government, and because of American plans to have these facilities closed by late 2009, thousands of angry and perhaps vengeful former prisoners will soon be released back into the community.30 Some of those released will undoubtedly seek revenge on the Americans and Iraqi security forces or on the informants who lead to their detention, while others will almost certainly now ally with or perhaps rejoin various insurgent movements. Making matters more complicated will be the return to Iraq of an estimated four million refugees who fled their country since 2003, as well as the return of a smaller but significant number of Iraqis who have been internally displaced in a complex migration within Iraq to avoid sectarian violence. The Iraq Red Crescent Organization estimates that 280,000 Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 03:10 25 July 2011 208 D E F E NC E S TUD I E S families have been displaced internally and in Baghdad alone there are nearly 170,000 families, accounting for half a million people, who have fled their homes. Nationally the pattern is for Sunnis generally to move north and west; Shi’ites have moved south and Christians have moved to the far north.31 An additional three million Iraqis have also fled the country mostly to Jordan and other neighbouring states. The effect of this de facto division of Iraq on a sectarian basis has contributed to a reduction of intercommunity violence. That so many of the population have retreated into fortified tribal zones, however, can only be partly considered a measure of progress. It is a development that bodes particularly badly for the prospects of either intercommunity reconciliation or even the eventual fragmentation of Iraq since the latter would require further and complex migrations. With security now much improved many of these displaced people are interested in returning home but this also brings its own problems as their homes are generally occupied by others, an issue which could reignite ethnic tensions. There is no organized process in place to handle this problem. Nor is there an international or Iraqi program to help people relocate elsewhere in Iraq (with, for example, housing grants to build new homes, which could also help create jobs).32 The process of reintegrating returning refugees before American forces are withdrawn is also a considerable challenge for the effectiveness and perceived impartiality of the Iraqi security forces. The third major challenge for the Iraqi authorities will be combating the organized crime and corruption that is and continues to be rife in Iraq. Organized crime, in all its forms, has been a major obstacle to the establishment of security, prosperity and order in Iraq in the post-invasion period. It has its origins, however, long before the invasion, in the nature of the regime run by Saddam Hussein and the attempt to subvert the United Nations sanctions regime imposed between 1991 and 2003 through various forms of state sanctioned smuggling. It remains an obstacle to nation building, infrastructure renewal, foreign investment and the revival of the Iraq economy. It is an aspect of regime failure which has been paid little attention either by the US or successive Iraqi governments and yet it remains an area of activity with a serious capacity to fund both insurgents and sectarian violence unless addressed. As such it has the potential to contribute significantly to the undermining of the political and security gains achieved in 2007 and 2008, and especially once coalition forces have departed.33 Organized crime in Iraq benefits from many of the endemic features of the post-invasion state. These include a weak central government; absence of the rule of law; and loyalties to class, sectarian identity, tribalism and family connection that prevent penetration from law enforcement officials. Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 03:10 25 July 2011 P ARADOX OF THE U S T R OOP S U R GE I N I R A Q 209 Organized crime also thrives among a climate of political and civic corruption and rampant violence. Battles for control over particular enterprises – such as oil smuggling in Basra, adds an addition source of violence and conflict. Criminality it is also inextricably linked to the insurgency in Iraq and sectarian divisions in that various forms of crime are used to finance violence and political activity and the failure to address this social affliction results from the fact that the police force established to uphold the rule of law is infiltrated by militias and riddled with corruption and sectarianism.34 The variety of activity perpetrated by organized crime in Iraq is considerable. The largest enterprise by far is the practice of oil smuggling, in its various forms. Other activities include trafficking in firearms; human trafficking, theft and trafficking in artefacts, extortion from shopkeepers and other businesses and the large-scale theft of copper from electricity pylons and power lines.35 There is also a large and thriving kidnapping industry. While this is mostly perpetrated against the Iraqi middle classes it also affects foreign workers who are considered to be worth more money and who are the target of choice if the motivation is politically motivated publicity. In many cases the gangs carrying out these kidnapping are better organized and armed than the police who are trying to prevent them. The corruption, incompetence and lack of impartiality of the police also prevent the eradication of this and other criminal activities. The extent and scale of organised criminality in Iraq is so pervasive and so much a part of the post-Saddam economy, however, that it is likely to remain a feature of Iraqi society, with all its associated costs, for the foreseeable future to come. Last the Iraqi government will need to address the key challenge of rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure, which continues to suffer chronic problems after decades of neglect. Throughout the occupation there has been little improvement in Iraqi infrastructure, despite coalition forces spending several billion dollars in reconstruction aid. Many Iraqi citizens remain unemployed, while the inability to agree a new oil law coupled with a general reduction in the price of Iraq’s most important commodity, makes all the above that much more difficult for the Iraqi government to achieve.36 The price of not achieving this however could be high, as it was in 2003, as the Iraqi populace will have only a temporary patience to see their quality of life improving, before they begin to turn against the central government. False Optimism and the Possible Future Shi’ite Challenge It is crucial that these problems stated above are addressed and solved because there are many groups potentially waiting in the wings for an Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 03:10 25 July 2011 210 D E F E NC E S TUD I E S opportunity to take power from the central government should conditions deteriorate. Top of this list will be the Madhi Army which evidence suggests is far from defeated and this militia in fact may simply be acknowledging a temporary strategic ceasefire, and possibly Al-Qaeda who continue to retain the capacity to attack troops and civilians on a regular basis. Underpinning the future threat from the Shi’ite south will be also be Iran, and how Tehran acts as coalition influence and forces reduce will be key to how much authority the central government can continue to hold on to, and whether Iraq can become a stable and functioning state. There is much evidence to suggest that the Madhi Army has not been defeated, and that Muqtada al-Sadr has continued to restructure his militias and expand his political options.37 The primary reason for this pessimism is that fact that many commentators believe that the successful resolution of the ‘Battle for Basra’ after which al-Sadr announced a ceasefire – and which had such important implications for the security of that city/governorate and for Iraq more generally – had far more to do with the political calculations of the radical Shi’ite cleric than it did with the battlefield prowess of the Iraqi security forces.38 For although the operation was primarily planned and carried out by the Iraqi security forces – their first major operation since 2003 – coalition and Iraqi aircraft patrolled the skies, helped with logistics, and were widely embedded in the Iraqi Army and with teams of special forces. Furthermore after the initial offensive stalled the Iraqis called upon substantial British and American air and artillery support to back up their effort. What is more and although the elections which followed seemed to suggest that support is waning for al-Sadr it is still widely believed that there are many waiting for his call to resume fighting, and that he is merely biding his time until the situation is more propitious. Moreover it is widely rumored that various Shi’ite militias and criminal elements, many of which are residing in Iran, are waiting for coalition forces to withdraw from Iraq before resuming their own drive for power.39 Evidence also suggests that al-Sadr still commands great loyalty and respect among the Iraqi population, particularly in Basra, where it is suggested that many Iraqis are simply waiting for a call to arms from the cleric to resume their fight for power and control of the province. Ominously one follower declared that ‘we will rise up as soon as Muqtada al-Sadr gives the order’.40 Despite announcing that the bulk of the Madhi Army would work towards peaceful civic objectives within the political process in mid-2008, it is widely believed that al-Sadr has reorganized that Mahdi Army into smaller specialist groups. These groups are now thought to be in Iran undergoing training and biding their time, lending weight to the suggestion Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 03:10 25 July 2011 P ARADOX OF THE U S T R OOP S U R GE I N I R A Q 211 that the improvement in security and the declaration of a ceasefire has more to do with a long-term political calculation by al-Sadr than to any groundbreaking progress by Iraqi forces.41 It seems likely therefore that the militias and other Iranian-backed personnel have gone underground and/ or to Iran to regroup and evade the current security crackdown. Iran has been a key player in Iraq following the March 2003 invasion and is likely to continue to want to expand its influence when coalition troops leave. For the first two years after the invasion Iran calculated that its interests were best served by supporting the entry of Iraq’s Shi’ite groups into the formal US-led election process. However after 2005 Iranian support gradually began to flow towards Shi’ite militia elements and generally encouraged them to immerse themselves within the Iraqi security forces, at the same Iran began actively arming and funding the Madhi Army and other Shi’ite insurgent groups through the Qom Battalion of the Revolutionary Guards. Iranian support in funding, training and advising various Shi’ite forces, particularly the Madhi Army, was key to the ability of Shi’ite militias to retain control in the south. During 2008 Iran also played a subtle but key role in the spring Battle of Basra, and months later tried hard to derail an agreement extending the mandate of US forces in Iraq.42 Considering the current international tensions over Iran’s nuclear program, Tehran is likely to continue to see its presence in Iraq, possibly through the Madhi Army and other dormant Shi’ite militias, as leverage and insurance against any future US actions. Last, and in addition to a strong and recalibrated Mahdi Army waiting in the wings, one should not forget the continuing threat from Al-Qaeda in Iraq. As the coalition forces continued to release prisoners from their large detention camps, many were rumoured to be rejoining Sunni insurgent groups under the umbrella of Al-Qaeda, while many reports suggest that AQI is merely waiting for US troops to leave before ‘staging a revolution’. One source has suggested that up to 60 percent of detainees were returning to the fight, while a colonel in Baghdad suggested the percentage could be closer to 90 percent. Despite being hamstrung since the Sunni Awakening, AQI has continued to show ability to send car and suicide bombers into Baghdad and elsewhere on a regular basis.43 The evidence would therefore suggest that Iraq is perhaps still to encounter many of its biggest challenges as a weak and infant central government tries to assert control as coalition forces leave the country. The challenge will be for the Iraqi government to solve some of these structural problems before the patience of the Iraqi populace runs out, which as coalition forces found out in 2003, is very hard to win back and may have catastrophic implications. Waiting in the wings if things go wrong will be Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 03:10 25 July 2011 212 D E F E NC E S TUD I E S Sunni tribes and insurgents, possibly backed by Al-Qaeda, and the Madhi Army possibly backed by Iran. If these two groups should feel that the time was right to launch their own bid for power and control Iraq could very easily descend into civil war, and the central government collapse. Conclusion Iraq is now unquestionably a far more stable place than it has perhaps ever been since the US-led invasion (Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’) of 2003, and the US troop Surge that began in 2007 certainly played an important part in creating these better conditions and in creating a sense of optimism for the future of the country. The fact that conditions are now better than at any time in the last seven years, with a marked reduction in violence, the return of commercial life and the successful recent provincial elections, is, as this article has shown, only part of the story. Consequently and as coalition troops begin their staged withdrawal and hand-over of power to the Iraqi authorities there is significant reason to suggest that the biggest challenges for the new state are yet to come. Of equal importance is the fact that many of these challenges are a direct consequence of the short-term policies and tactics that have allowed for the current period of relative peace and stability. The troop Surge was just one of several factors that combined to bequeath the current period of stability and security, and would arguably not have been possible without prior indigenous developments, and could not have facilitated troop withdrawals without what seems to be a tactical Madhi Army ceasefire in June 2008. The roots of stability lie in the tactics used by Al-Qaeda – which eventually became too much for the Sunni insurgents to handle – and in the intuition and gradual change of strategy by the US military on the ground. Without the Sunni Awakening the Surge probably would not have been strategically or politically possible. However, endorsing the Awakening has bequeathed its own set of problems; namely how to reintegrate the semi-autonomous Sunni tribes and fighters with the Shi’ite central government in Baghdad. Then there is the issue of how well the Iraqi authorities can deal with a hole multitude of strategic problems as coalition troops began their staged withdrawal to be completed by the end of 2011 – evidence would suggest that many of the biggest tests are still to come, and that the infant and unproven Iraqi institutions will have to face these alone. Last, there is the issue of the Madhi Army and Iran, whose tactical ceasefire was key to ensuring stability during late 2008 and most of 2009, but which suggests that they are merely biding their time for the future knowing as they do the pressure for coalition troops to leave Iraq expeditiously. Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 03:10 25 July 2011 P ARADOX OF THE U S T R OOP S U R GE I N I R A Q 213 If the central government and security forces cannot deal with the problems they seem almost certain to face then Iran and the Madhi Army, and perhaps Al-Qaeda too, will be waiting in the wings to exploit any opportunities that are presented. If this is the case, and the Sunnis, Shi’ites and Kurds all become equally disillusioned with the way things are unfolding in the new Iraq, the stage could be set for another round of internecine violence and civil war. NOTES 1 Steven Simon, ‘The Price of the Surge’, Foreign Affairs 87/1 (2008) pp.60–1. 2 Andrew Phillips, ‘How Al Qaeda lost Iraq’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 63/1 (2009) pp.72–3. 3 Ibid. pp.73–5. 4 Thomas E. Ricks, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006–2008 (London: Allen Lane 2009) pp.161–2. 5 John McCary, ‘The Anbar Awakening: an alliance of incentives’, Washington Quarterly 32/1 (2009) pp.49–50. 6 Austin Long, ‘The Anbar Awakening’, Survival 50/2 (April–May 2008) p.67 and McCary (note 5) pp.44–5. 7 See Ricks, The Gamble (note 4). 8 Bush quoted in Kimberly Kagan, ‘The Iraq Report II: the Baghdad security plan begins’, Time, 15 March 2007. 9 Ricks, The Gamble (note 4) p.103. 10 Bush, quoted in Kimberly Kagan (note 9). 11 Mary Kaldor, ‘The Paradox of Basra’, Opendemocracy.net, 13 Jan. 2009. 12 Michael Knights and Ed Williams, ‘The Calm before the Storm: the British Experience in Southern Iraq’, Policy Focus 66 (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy Feb. 2007) 41pp. including map. 13 Anthony Cordesman and Jose Ramos, ‘Sadr and the Madhi Army: Evolution, Capabilities, and a New Direction’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 4 Aug. 2008. 14 Marisa Cochrane, ‘Iraq Report No.9: The Battle for Basra’, Institute for the Study of War, Washington DC, 23 June 2008. 15 Kenneth Katzman, ‘Iran’s activities and influences in Iraq’, Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, 13 Feb. 2009. 16 UK Dept. for International Development, ‘Elections in Basra’, 4 March 2009, <http:// blogs.dfid.gov.uk/2009/03/elections-in-basra/>. 17 Katzman (note 15). 18 Qassim Abdul-Zahra, ‘Anti-US cleric facing leadership challenge’, Associated Press, 20 Feb. 2009. 19 Simon (note 1). 20 Long (note 6) pp.67–8 and 88 21 Ibid. pp.86–7. 22 Rod Nordland and Alissa Rubin, ‘Sunni fighters say Iraq didn’t keep job promises’, New York Times, 24 March 2009. 23 Liz Sly, ‘Economic downturn finally hits Iraq’, Los Angeles Times, 11 May 2009. 24 Nordland and Rubin (note 22). 25 See Anthony Shadidn, ‘In Iraq, Chaos Feared as US Closes Prison’, Washington Post, 22 March 2009. 26 Yochi J. Dreazen et al., ‘US Shifts Iraq Focus as Local Tactics Gain’, Wall Street Journal, 5 Sept. 2007. Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 03:10 25 July 2011 214 D E F E NC E S TUD IE S Downloaded by [University of Warwick] at 03:10 25 July 2011 27 Michael E. O’Hanlon and Ann Gildroy, ‘Iraq: Reasons for Strategic Patience’, Washington Post, 16 April 2008. 28 Roula Khalaf, ‘Between Iraq’s needs and dreams’, Financial Times, 27 Oct. 2008. 29 Alissa Rubin and Marc Santora, ‘Bomber kills dozens in Iraq as fears of new violence rise’, New York Times, 10 March 2009. 30 See Anthony Shaddin, ‘In Iraq, chaos feared as US closes prison’, Washington Post, 22 March 2009. 31 James Glanz and Alissa J. Rubin, ‘Migration Reshapes Iraq’s Sectarian Landscape’, New York Times, 19 Sept. 2007. 32 O’Hanlon and Gildroy (note 27). 33 Phil Williams, ‘Organized Crime and Corruption in Iraq’, International Peacekeeping 16/1 (Feb. 2009) pp.117–18. 34 See Williams (note 33) pp.115–35. 35 Ibid. pp.123–8. 36 Ibid. pp.115–35. 37 Cordesman and Ramos (note 13) pp.2–3. 38 Charles Crain, ‘How Moqtada al-Sadr won in Basra’, Time, 1 April 2008. 39 Paul Bradley, ‘Crime likely to rise as troops pull out of Iraq’, Birmingham Post (UK), 17 March 2009; BBC monitoring Middle East, ‘Officials warn special groups might return to Basra’, 17 March 2009. 40 Sudarsan Raghavan, ‘A quiet filled with wariness’, Washington Post, 26 Feb. 2009. 41 Crain (note 38); Katzman (note 15). 42 Katzman (note 15). 43 Toby Dodge, ‘Despite the optimism, Iraq is close to the edge’, The Observer (London), 21 Dec. 2008.