The elephant in the room: ballistic missile defence under Obama more

The elephant in the room: US ballistic missile defence under Barack Obama by Andrew Futter POLSIS, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, B15 2TT It was widely assumed that with the election of Barack Obama the ballistic missile defence (BMD) programme so cherished by his predecessor George W Bush would fall from prominence and be significantly scaled back. The rhetoric of the Obama Administration, the popular understanding of the end of the ³Third Site´ BMD plan for Europe, as well as the political battle over the New START Treaty with Russia has done little to dispel this perception. Conventional wisdom seems to hold that under Obama, ballistic missile defence has been rationalised, recalibrated and de-emphasized as a tool of national security policymaking. It is thus brought in line with the popular perception of his wider foreign policy agenda. Under this reading, BMD is no longer a central component of US security policy or, at least, is no longer seen as being more important than other non-proliferation and security agendas. Consequently, it seems persuasive that in the time he has been in office, Obama has made substantial changes to the BMD programme that have undermined its importance and centrality as a tool of US national security policy. John R Bolton, amongst others, has argued that there is every possibility of returning to some type of anti-ballistic missile treaty in the near future.1 However, and while the BMD programme has certainly changed since Obama came to office, the US missile defence project has experienced a reorientation of focus rather than shift in strategic goal, and remains a central and fundamental component of US security thinking. Current policy is best understood as a continuation rather than change in the general trajectory and development of US BMD under Bush, and as such, the programme has lost 1 little of its prominence and importance. In fact, one could argue that BMD is getting closer under Obama to becoming an established and accepted norm of US and international security policy. To this end three main dynamics stand out: 1) despite the rhetoric and posturing both before and after the 2008 Presidential election which implied that Obama would significantly scale-back the BMD programme, trade away the European missile defence plan for a deal on strategic arms reductions and diplomatic help from Russia in dealing with Iran, and the much publicised $1.2bn Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 BMD budget cut, the strategic rationale and centrality of the BMD programme essentially changed very little during Obama¶s first six months in office. 2) In contrast to the perception held by many prominent conservative and some more liberal commentators that Obama¶s decision to end the ³Third Site´ missile defence proposal for Europe represented a significant volte face ± and a termination of BMD in Europe ± the much less well publicised ³Phased Adaptive Approach´ (PAA) which replaces it has the potential to be far more comprehensive and become operational far quicker than the previous plan. As a result, if anything, the PAA actually represents a greater commitment to BMD in Europe than the ³Third Site´. 3) A close reading of the February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report (BMDR) and the unwillingness to use missile defence as a bargaining chip during the New START negotiations, indicates that the new plan for Europe may become the basis for US BMD policy throughout the globe, creating at least the possibility that we will see a significant ³ramping up´ of BMD deployments in the not too distant future, itself suggesting both that the Bush era goal of constructing a global layered missile defence remains unchanged, and that BMD is becoming an accepted element of US security policy. There is much to suggest that the US ballistic missile defence programme is still alive and well under Barack Obama and that little has changed regarding the programme¶s overall 2 strategic goal. The only real recalibration has been tactical and has involved a renewed emphasis on strengthening the protective capacity against regional and short-range missile threats, and on fostering cooperative BMD programmes across the globe, but this has been done because the administration feels that the 30 Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) missiles already deployed in the US are sufficient to combat the current and medium term threat from a limited long-range missile attack, and not instead of it. With BMD funding retained at around $8bn annually (not including funding for Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 and Medium Extended Air Defence System (MEADS))2, more than twice the level, in real terms, under President¶s Reagan, George HW Bush or Clinton, and as much as the average yearly request under George W Bush3, the programme seems likely to continue well into the foreseeable future, becoming further entrenched and normalised as a key component of US security policy. TIME FOR A CHANGE: THE OBAMA REVOLUTION IN MISSILE DEFENCE POLICY? Everything about the election of Barack Obama seemed to suggest that an aggressive and expansive ballistic missile defence programme ± such as had been pursued by his predecessor - would not become the centrepiece of the new President¶s national security strategy, and much suggested that BMD would be put on the ³back-burner´ whilst time and attention was focused on other international priorities and on Obama¶s extensive and ambitious domestic agenda. The rhetoric used during the Presidential election campaign, the palpable desire to focus on renewing US foreign policy and relations with Russia, and particularly the much publicised Fiscal Year 2010 BMD budget cut, did little to dispel this popular perception. Minimal attention seemed to be paid to the substantial structural BMD legacy inherited from his predecessor, and the relatively limited room for manoeuvre this would give any new 3 President, at least over the short-term. As such - barring a slight change of focus and perhaps attitude - little of any tangible nature actually occurred during Obama¶s first six months in office to suggest that BMD would not continue as a key component of national security and non-proliferation policy. Although almost every American Presidential Administration since the Second World War has entertained in some capacity the idea of constructing defences against the threat of ballistic missiles, and despite the fact that most people tend to associate the concept with Ronald Reagan and his 1983 ³Strategic Defense Initiative´ (SDI), BMD has only really become a tangible reality, with assets actually being deployed ± notwithstanding Safeguard in the mid-1970s 4 - since the early 2000s. The main reason for this was the unerring determination of George W Bush to push ahead with the system after his election in late 2000, and especially after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Under his stewardship the US ballistic missile defence programme grew exponentially and rapidly: the AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was abrogated in 2002; the Pentagon began deploying assets in Alaska and California to guard against long-range missile threats in 2004; agreements were reached with Poland and the Czech Republic over expanding the nascent system to Europe by 2008; and the BMD budget soared to around $10bn annually ± more than double that of the Reagan, Bush Sr. and Clinton years. Consequently, when Obama assumed office in early 2009 he was presented with something of a fait accompli. Considering this structural legacy and inheritance, whoever won the 2008 Presidential election was unlikely to be able to make significant alterations to the BMD programme. Nevertheless, Obama¶s campaign rhetoric seemed to suggest that, if elected, his Administration would try to curb and downgrade the importance of the programme. Most 4 notably during a debate with Republican Presidential candidate Senator John McCain over how to respond to the growing proliferation threat from Iran in mid-2008, Obama declared that ³direct and aggressive diplomacy´ represented a far better way of dealing with Iran than the imposition and expansion of ballistic missile defences favoured by both his opponent and the incumbent President George W Bush. 5 Apart from this, and although Obama mentioned BMD only briefly during his election campaign, the general feeling was that an Obama victory would mean wholesale changes to the programme in the light of a widely expected fresh approach to diplomacy and US foreign relations.6 In an interview with Arms Control Today shortly after his being elected, Obama began to outline what his future BMD policy might be like and how he would seek to change and amend the programme he had inherited. With regard to the growing threat of nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) threats and the means to deliver them, the President-elect declared that: Missile defenses can be a significant part of a plan to reduce these [nuclear, biological and chemical] dangers, but they must be proven to work and pursued as part of an integrated approach that uses the full range of nonproliferation policy tools in response to the full range of threats we face. In the same interview, Obama also made it clear that: In our haste to deploy missile defenses, we cannot lose sight of the real 21st century threats. The biggest nuclear security risk is not from a rogue state lashing out with ballistic missiles, but from a terrorist smuggling a crude nuclear device across our borders.7 Both statements suggested ± much to the chagrin of BMD supporters, conservative commentators and enthusiasts in the Republican Party and elsewhere ± that missile defence 5 would not receive the time, attention or political capital it had under Bush. Instead, it seemed the new Administration would place far more emphasis on the power of diplomacy and on pursuing multi-lateral solutions to the international problems faced by the US. Once in office, Obama¶s early manoeuvring did little to dispel this understanding, especially when it became clear that BMD and, particularly, the plan to deploy BMD assets in Europe represented a major contradiction and stumbling block in his overall strategy. At the centre of the new Administration¶s foreign policy was the desire to ³reset´ relations with Russia. This was, in part, to pave the way for a new strategic arms reductions agreement (START) and also to kick start the ³global nuclear disarmament campaign´ outlined in Prague in April 2009.8 What is more, Obama had made it abundantly clear that his major priorities were domestic ± chiefly reforming the American health care system and dealing with the economic recession. Standing in the way of all these policy goals was the Bush Administration¶s ³Third Site´ missile defence plan in Poland and the Czech Republic and the nascent indigenous US system more generally. Paramount amongst these problems was Russian President Dmitri Medvedev who had made it abundantly clear that the US BMD programme represented a major barrier to better relations. Medvedev warned Obama that ³the accelerated imposition on Europe of the American missile defense system will destabilise the foundations of global order´. In response, Moscow would counter American missile defense plans by ³deploying jamming facilities and short-range Iskander ballistic missiles in the Kaliningrad enclave´.9 In essence, the logic seemed simple: missile defence in Europe would be sacrificed in order to help ³reset´ relations with Moscow, provide a springboard towards a New START Treaty and nuclear disarmament, whilst allowing the Obama team to focus on other more pressing policy 6 priorities.10 In February 2009, this assessment of the future of BMD seemed to be given added credibility when it was revealed by the New York Times that a secret letter had been sent by Obama to Medvedev in which the American President apparently offered to trade the ³Third Site´ plan in exchange for Moscow¶s help in preventing Iran from developing longrange nuclear weapons.11 Despite this gesture, the Obama Administration did not make any moves to alter or discard the plan for Europe during its first nine months of office. The feeling that BMD was in the process of significant change, recalibration and possible relegation, was further exacerbated by the reaction, particularly from conservative defence analysts such as Frank Gaffney Jr., to the fiscal year 2010 defence budget, released by the Pentagon in April 2009. Gaffney accused the Obama team of ³significantly reducing America¶s missile defense programs´;12 others argued that the request contained ³sweeping changes´ to the nation¶s BMD programme, 13 whilst even more liberal-minded commentators accepted that the new budget represented a significant scaling back of the Bush programmes. The consternation was driven not only by the announcement that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) had requested $7.8bn ± which amounted to a $1.2bn reduction from the previous year¶s appropriation ± but also by an acknowledgement that funding would be skewed towards regional programmes designed to counter short- and medium-range missile threats such as Aegis, SM-3 and THAAD, and away from futuristic programmes and those designed to protect against long-range threats, such as the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI). Such feelings were compounded by the cuts made in the Air Borne Laser (ABL) programme and by the announcement that the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) and Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) programmes would be cancelled, along with the plan to deploy a further 14 GBI¶s in Alaska and California.14 7 BMD supporters in Congress treated the budget with equal concern - Congressman Trent Franks (R-Az) remarked during the House Armed Services Committee hearing: I think that is incredibly the wrong direction to take this budget and our country on missile defense given the growing threats we face and given the growing attitude of other nations to have missile programs.15 In a similar vein, Congressman Howard McKeon (R-Ca), speaking some months later, declared: ³considering the threat that exists, it is ludicrous to me that we would cut funding for critical national defense capabilities´.16 Franks and McKeon were not alone as many other BMD proponents ± notably Senator John Kyl (R-Az) - slammed the new budget request, which they believed left the US vulnerable to long-range missile attack. This in turn helped fuel the perception that the new budget represented a significant scaling back in BMD policy and a tangible change of focus.17 A closer look at the request, however, suggests that much of this hyperbole ± if genuine rather than political - was largely unjustified. In a speech accompanying the new budget, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made it clear that although the request ³focus[es] on the µrogue state¶ and theatre missile threat´ the Pentagon would ³continue to robustly fund continued research and development to improve the capability we already have to defend against long-range rogue missile threats´.18 Gates remarked that the US already had the defences it needed to protect against a long-range ballistic missile of the type that North Korea (or possibly Iran) might fire, adding that, ³if there was a launch from a µrogue state¶ such as North Korea, I have good confidence that we would be able to deal with it´.19 8 The fact that the Administration already felt that the US had enough assets to protect against current and near future long-range threats was a key reason why funding was skewed towards regional BMD programmes. Moreover, the multi-billion dollar programmes that were cancelled had little, if any, chance of actually coming to fruition. As such, the budget strengthened, rather than weakened the US¶s BMD posture and did not fundamentally deviate from the Bush Administration¶s goal of establishing a global layered defensive system. Nevertheless, the popular perception ± whether from right or left of the professional and political divide ± seemed to understand the budget as a representing a major change in US BMD strategy. Greg Bingham ± an analyst at the Kenrich Group consultancy firm ± even exclaimed that he could not ³remember the last time a Secretary of Defense proposed such far reaching changes´.20 One of the few commentators to argue that the budget request was essentially a continuation of what had gone before was Michael O¶Hanlon, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, who contended that; ³it is hard to view President Obama¶s cutbacks as seriously lessening the United States¶ commitment to the long-term goal of defending itself and its allies from missile attack´. Moreover, he pointed out that, ³the new BMD budget is still 50 per cent higher than it was during the Reagan years´.21 But O¶Hanlon¶s analysis very much went against the grain of expert opinion ± particularly amongst the conservative and hawkish analysts at the American Enterprise Institute, The Heritage Foundation, and the Centre for Security Policy.22 As such, it became widely assumed that BMD was being cut back, rationalised and downgraded. Despite much heady rhetoric and the perceived political and diplomatic benefits associated with downgrading US missile defence plans, the Obama Administration essentially changed little of any significant or tangible nature regarding the US BMD 9 programme during its first six months in office. This trend was strongly reiterated by the Administration¶s intention not to use BMD as a bargaining chip ± as many analysts believed it would be - in various diplomatic interactions with Russia. ALTERING NOT CANCELLING MISSILE DEFENCE PLANS IN EUROPE The key litmus test for the Obama Administration and BMD was always likely to be what was done about the Bush Administration¶s proposal to deploy ten long-range interceptor missiles in Poland and an X-band radar in the Czech Republic to counter the missile threat from Iran ± known collectively as the ³Third Site´ plan.23 The plan had been a key component of the Bush national security programme and had become something of an article of faith among BMD advocates in Congress and parts of the Washington think-tank community. When Obama announced in mid-September 2009 that the Pentagon would be cancelling the ³Third Site´ proposal, the decision was largely perceived as representing a key change in, and retraction of, US BMD policy. Despite popular misperception, the Obama Administration did not cancel BMD in Europe; it merely altered and recalibrated it. What seems to have been overlooked by many commentators at the time was the likelihood that the new plan ± known as the ³Phased Adaptive Approach´ (PAA) - might prove more comprehensive, provide better protection against near-term threats, and come into operation far quicker that anything proposed by the Bush Administration. The decision to cancel the ³Third Site´ was probably underpinned by a combination of dynamics, not least of which was the priority placed on negotiating a new arms reductions agreement with Russia and enlisting Moscow¶s support in dealing with Iran. It was also undoubtedly driven by the Pentagon¶s judgement that the 30 GBI¶s already deployed in silos in the US were sufficient to deal with the long-range ³rogue state´ missile threat from either 10 North Korea or Iran. This belief was firmly bolstered by evidence from the National Intelligence Council (NIC), which suggested that the Iranian long-range missile threat was evolving slower than had originally been expected. It also believed that Iran¶s short and medium-range programmes were developing far quicker. In addition to this, reports from the on-going internal µMissile Defence Review¶ had suggested that the most promising and proven technologies, such as the Aegis sea-based system and SM-3 interceptor missile, should be prioritised over the expensive and unreliable GBI programme.24 A White House spokesman declared: Changes in threat as well as our capabilities and technologies underscore the need for an adaptable architecture. This architecture is responsive to the current threat, but could also incorporate relevant technologies quickly and cost-effectively in responding to evolving threats.25 Instead of the ten ground-based interceptor missiles in Poland and X-band radar in the Czech Republic, which under the original plan would have become operational towards the end of the decade (2018 at the earliest), Obama¶s replacement ³Phased, Adaptive Approach´ plan called for a more evolutionary commitment. This was one that would gradually expand to meet possible future developments in threat and incorporate advances in technology, potentially utilising numerous radar and possibly hundreds of SM-3 interceptor missiles on land and at sea. As such, with the US theoretically already capable of defending against a limited long-range Iranian missile threat, the plan represented a re-focussing of tactics to deal with a change in threat. Beginning with the provision of a rudimentary defence of Southeastern Europe against short-range missiles by 2011 and potentially finishing with a comprehensive defence 11 against all types of missile threat aimed at Europe or the US by 2020 ± with the possibility of incorporating ground-based long-range interceptors if these were deemed necessary in the future ± the PAA seems set to represent a substantial expansion of US BMD activities rather than a ³rationalisation´. Moreover, the new plan relies extensively on the Aegis sea-based BMD system and the Standard Missile-3 interceptor, both of which remain amongst the better performing and more mature programmes under development at the Pentagon.26 The four stages of the plan are listed below: 1. The first phase calls for fielding by 2011 the Aegis sea-based BMD system armed with SM-3 (Ia) interceptor missiles to protect US troops and parts of Southeastern Europe against short-range missile attack. 2. The second phase calls for fielding by 2015 a new SM-3 (IIb) interceptor missile both at sea and on land (at basis in Northern and Southern Europe), allowing for protection of a wider area against short and medium range ballistic missiles. 3. The third stage by 2018 would be to deploy an even more powerful SM-3 (IIa) interceptor missile, in addition to previous deployments, that could be used against short, medium of intermediate range attacks against the entire European landmass. 4. By 2020, the plan would see the deployment of the SM-3 (IIb) interceptor missile against all types of threats giving the system the capacity to protect all of Europe and the United States against ICBM threats.27 12 Each stage involves the deployment of a more advanced SM-3 interceptor missile and the integration of more radar and sensor technology by linking in with current NATO and European (and possibly Russian)28 missile and air defence programmes. To this end, the White House has not ruled out the possibility of returning to the idea of housing long-range interceptor missiles in Poland or a radar in the Czech Republic, should changes in threat or technology necessitate. The Congressional Research Service has estimated the cost of the system over the next decade to be around $5bn, though this is likely to change and does not take into account the cost of the Aegis ships required to field the system.29 The perception that the decision to end the ³Third Site´ plan represented a ³prudent rationalisation´ of the US BMD effort was not helped by the rhetoric of missile defence advocates both in Congress and amongst the Washington policy community. Congressman Howard McKeon (R-Ca) stressed his concern that, ³the Administration is heading down a path where it is willing to undercut our allies and cave in to Russian demands on vital national security matters´.30 Representative John Boehner (R-Oh) remarked that the decision ³shows a wilful determination to continue ignoring the threat posed by some of the most dangerous regimes in the world´,31 and Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky) that it was ³shortsighted and harmful to our long term security interest´.32 Peter Baker, writing in the New York Times, went as far as to suggest that the decision to end the ³Third Site´ was ³one of the sharpest revisions of the national security policy inherited from Mr Bush´.33 Whilst numerous conservative defence commentators berated the change in policy, a relatively muted response from ³arms controllers´, coupled with a mishandled announcement of the change by the Obama Administration, which focused attention on the ³cancellation´ rather than its replacement, did little to dispel this understanding. Furthermore, the role of 13 Russia was inadvertently highlighted by making the announcement on the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland. Both did little to alter the perception that US missile defence in Europe had undergone a significant recalibration. Consequently, attention was diverted away from the other rationales for the change of plan and, most importantly, away from what would replace it. As a direct result, many in the US policy and think-tank community simply were not aware of, or paid little attention to, the Obama administrations replacement of the ³Third Site¶ with the ³Phased, Adaptive Approach´, or that this did not represent a downsizing of the US missile defence commitment in Europe. The Administration made no secret of its revamped BMD plans for Europe. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates for one was keen to stress that the Administration was ³strengthening - not scrapping - missile defense in Europe´, and even went so far as to say that, ³the new configuration provides a better missile defense capability than the programme I recommended almost 3 years ago´.34 What is more, General James Cartwright (Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) made it abundantly clear that the Administration remained committed to BMD, stating that the ³long-range goal is to deploy a global network of mobile interceptors and sensors [and] a sufficient number of ships to allow us to have a global deployment of this capability on a constant basis´.35 Pentagon officials were also equally quick to point out that ³every phase of the plan will include scores of SM-3 missiles´,36 and have made no secret of the fact that system is almost certain to involve significantly more interceptor missiles than the ten that would have been fielded in Poland.37 As a result, if the current plan goes ahead as scheduled, it is quite likely that as early as 2015 around 40-50 SM-3 interceptors could be in place on land in Europe (in addition to those already deployed at sea) and at least three years before the previous plan would have 14 come to fruition. Perhaps most importantly, phase four of the plan, which would involve a highly developed version of the SM-3 interceptor capable of protecting Europe and the US from long-range missile attacks, would represent a far greater defensive capability than anything proposed by the Bush Administration for Europe. Whereas the cancellation of the ³Third Site´ plan represents a change in tactics, it does not mean that the Obama Administration has cancelled the idea of missile defence in Europe. The largely misunderstood ³Phased, Adaptive Approach´ that replaces it has the potential to be more comprehensive, involve far more assets and become operational far quicker than anything planned by the Bush Administration. What has been witnessed is a change in focus from protecting the homeland, which is already defended by 30 GBI¶s, to strengthening provisions for protecting troops and allies in the region against short range threats, and from future missile threats to present ones. As such, the Bush-era goal of developing a layered missile defence has not changed. BMDR, NPR AND NEW START: BMD IS BECOMING MORE NOT LESS IMPORTANT According to the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) Report released by the Pentagon in early February 2010, the ³Phased, Adaptive Approach´ to BMD in Europe will become the template for US BMD policy in other regions of the world. Moreover, the BMDR makes it clear that the Obama Administration is pursuing this approach because of, and not instead of, the capability to defend the US against a limited long-range missile threat. When this is combined with the large-scale multilateral BMD effort central to the Obama BMD plan, the increased role for BMD in nuclear deterrence outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review and the bullish commitment not to accept restraints on BMD policy in either the New START 15 agreement with Russia or in discussions with China, there is strong evidence to suggest that, rather than seeing BMD relegated in importance, its significance to US policy is increasing. On 1 February 2010, the Pentagon released the first official Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report that had been mandated by Congress and started back in March 2009. Along with the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), both of which emphasized the role and growing importance of BMD for the Administration, the BMDR was designed to provide a detailed overview of the Obama Administration¶s strategic policy. The Review outlined six main goals of the US BMD programme: 1. Continue to defend the homeland against limited ballistic missile threats 2. Defend against regional missile threats to US forces, allies and regional partners 3. Deploy capabilities only when proven through testing 4. Ensure commitment to new capabilities is fiscally sustainable over the longrun 5. Ensure the programme is flexible enough to adapt as threats change 6. The US will seek to lead expanded international efforts on missile defence.38 The most fundamental aspect of the Report was the confirmation that with 30 Ground Based Interceptor missiles currently deployed in silos in Alaska and California and twinned with an expansive network of radar and sensors, the Obama Administration felt that the US was currently protected against a limited long-range missile threat. According to the Report, ³The United States is currently protected against the threat of limited ICBM attacks as a result of investments made over the past decade´. It continued, that consequently, ³the United 16 States will refocus its homeland missile defence plans to maintain the current level of capability whilst continuing to hedge against future uncertainties´.39 As a result of this development, the Report maintains that more focus and energy can be concentrated on objective number two, namely protecting US troops and allies overseas from shorter-range missile threats through ³regional based adaptive approaches that are tailored to the threats facing each region, the capabilities available, and the technologies best suited for deployment´. 40 To this end, the Report announced that the Obama Administration would be pursuing ³Phased Adaptive Approaches´, based on the new European model, in specific regions ± primarily Europe, the Greater Middle East and East Asia ± but also elsewhere around the world that would be ³tailored to the threats and circumstances unique to that region´.41 According to the Report, these would enable ³a flexible, scalable response to BMD threats around the world by incorporating new technologies quickly and cost-effectively and by maintaining a focus on current threat assessments´.42 Moves have already been made to begin implementing the Review¶s recommendations and, in particular, to µStrengthening International Cooperation¶. For example, in early February 2010 the State Department announced that agreements had been reached for Romania (and possibly Bulgaria) to become part of the European ³Phased Adaptive Approach´ by agreeing to host the land-based SM-3 interceptors needed for phase two of the programme planned for 2015, with Poland having already tacitly agreed to house the Northern onshore SM-3 interceptor site needed for phase three scheduled for around 2018. 43 The Obama Administration has also pushed ahead expediently to integrate the new plan with NATO¶s ³ALT-BMD´ programme, and other missile defence assets in Europe.44 17 To this end, Alliance leaders have already announced that that the European PAA ³reinforces NATO¶s central role in missile defense in Europe´.45 Moreover, in co-ordination with the PAA, NATO has also endorsed the US plan to provide missile defense coverage over all European member states as part of the New Strategic Concept agreed at its 19-20 November 2010 Summit meeting in Lisbon. 46 In concert with the BMD developments in Europe, which in many respects is the first tangible embodiment of the new missile defence plan, the Obama Administration has also begun implementing the sixth main objective of the Review which declares that multilateral and bilateral efforts would be stepped up with various US allies in regions across the world. The intention is that these allies should help share the burden and establish a network of regional missile defences across the globe to supplement the US system. In late January 2010, for example, it was announced that the US would be fielding additional PAC-3 interceptor batteries in four Middle Eastern Nations bordering Iran as a buffer against potential Iranian retaliation to the economic sanctions related to Teheran¶s nuclear programme. Two Patriot PAC-3 batteries each were to be deployed in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, whilst Aegis warships began maintaining a continuous presence in the waters around the Persian Gulf. 47 In addition, the UAE amongst others, has also expressed interest in buying US THAAD BMD batteries.48 Supplementing this is a nascent phased, adaptive approach ± in all but name ± in East Asia to combat the potential threat from North Korea. When added to the Obama Administration¶s desire to push ahead with BMD cooperation with Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, this points to an extensive US missile defence commitment in the region.49 18 The rationale and dynamics of the BMDR was also firmly grounded in the Administration¶s FY2011 BMD budget request in which the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) requested $8.4bn for BMD (totalling nearly $10bn overall). The focus continued to be on combating the short- and medium-range regional threats to US troops and allies throughout the world. To this end $1.6bn, was requested for the Aegis sea-based system, $859m for THAAD, and $281m for the ³Aegis ashore´ programme. The Ground-based interceptor programme would receive $1.3bn, but this would be for completing further missile silos at Ft Greely and not for additional deployments of interceptors, which would be held at 30. Notably, $319m was requested for joint SM-3 development with Japan and significant funds for joint-cooperation on the Arrow BMD system with Israel.50 However, just days before the budget was released, Congressman Michael Turner (R-Oh), described the FY2011 budget request as, ³the litmus test of whether the Administration is truly committed to its missile defense policy or merely paying it ± and our nation and allies ± lip service´.51 His observation is a useful indication of the continued misperception of what is really happening with BMD. As a result, far from suggesting that BMD has shrunk in importance, there is every reason to conclude that it will become even more enmeshed and enshrined within both US and international security thinking. For example, the most obvious future implication of the ³Phased Adaptive Approach´ for Europe is that the US may have the capability to intercept all types of missiles aimed at Europe and the US from this region, including potentially part of the Russian nuclear arsenal. If this is taken as a model across the globe, which according to the BMDR it is, then it is quite conceivable that there will be a considerable expansion of US BMD activity in the near future. 19 One further aspect that highlights the Obama Administration¶s determination to push ahead with BMD, has been the fact these plans have continued to be pursued despite strong and growing Russian and, to a lesser extent Chinese, concerns. More specifically, the fact that the Obama Administration forcefully and stubbornly rejected Moscow¶s attempts to link the negotiations over New START to the limitation of future US BMD deployments is a strong indication of the importance Obama places on missile defence.52 Although critics have made much of the unilateral Russian statement on BMD that accompanied the signing of the new START Treaty in April 2010 ± which added to the perception that the Obama Administration was trying to limit and downgrade BMD - the Treaty nevertheless contains no official limits on US missile defences.53 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates unequivocally declared in a May 2010 Wall St Journal op-ed that, The Treaty will not constrain the U.S. from developing and deploying defenses against ballistic missiles, as we have made clear to the Russian government. The US will continue to deploy and improve the interceptors that defend our homeland ² those based in California and Alaska. We are also moving forward with plans to field missile defense systems to protect our troops and partners in Europe, the Middle East, and Northeast Asia against the dangerous threats posed by rogue nations like North Korea and Iran.54 Gates, Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, other senior Obama Administration officials, as well as numerous other foreign policy specialists, have firmly rejected claims that the Treaty in any way limits US missile defence plans. In addition to this, another factor that points to the centrality of BMD is the renewed enthusiasm within the Obama Administration ± and within NATO - to establish some type of 20 BMD cooperation with Russia. Such an agreement may offer the possibility of removing BMD as a major stumbling block in US-Russian relations. It might well provide a springboard for more BMD expansion, and perhaps a basis for agreeing to further nuclear arms cuts.55 Even relatively rudimentary cooperation, such as coordinated deployments or the sharing of missile launch data, would appear to offer reassurance that the system is not aimed at Russia or that it could it be used against them.56 As NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has argued, ³Politically, it would be a clear demonstration that the missile defense system is not directed against Russia « And militarily, it would make the whole system more effective´.57 To this end, the Obama Administration has sent delegations to Moscow and, in coordination with NATO, has been holding talks with Russian officials about collaborating on BMD. 58 The January 2011 meeting of the NATO-Russia Council, for example, involved serious consultations on the possible creation of a European missile defense system and other joint projects.59 Ballistic missile defence therefore seems likely to remain a centrepiece of the Obama Administration¶s national security strategy for the foreseeable future. Although applied slightly differently from the Bush Administration, it represents a continuation of, rather than a break from, past policy. If the programme for Europe is to be taken as an example, the result my well be a more comprehensive system of missile defences than even the Bush Administration might have envisaged. The key difference is that with the homeland theoretically protected, the focus of the programme has shifted to improving and strengthening the complementary protection of forward-deployed US forces and allies against regional threats. 21 CONCLUSION: BMD IS ALIVE, WELL, AND THRIVING UNDER OBAMA Despite the views of many prominent conservative and, to a lesser extent, liberal commentators, ballistic missile defence remains an integral component of the Obama Administration¶s national security strategy. Rather than scaling the programme back or relegating its importance, there has been a conscious effort to recalibrate the programme, not diminish it. Part of this tactical change has been driven by the 30 GBI¶s already deployed in Alaska and California, which the Pentagon is confident gives the US the capacity to defend itself against a limited future long-range missile threat. Consequently, the Obama Administration has turned its attention to strengthening complementary systems designed to protect against short and medium-range missile threats in regions across the world. The decision to alter, rather than cancel, missile defence in Europe is a revealing example of this new approach. Underpinning this change in tactics, is the intention to give the BMD system more flexibility to deal with different types of threat, utilise different types of technology, and address concerns in different regions as and when such a need arises. In essence the objective is to retain some sort of flexible ³missile defence surge capacity´ to deploy around the world, in addition to the stationary system deployed in the US. As such, there has been a continuation, rather than a deviation, from the Bush Administration¶s goal of developing a global layered missile defence system. The most valuable insight into how BMD policy will develop under Obama was revealed by the February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defence and Nuclear Posture Review Reports, which strongly suggest that BMD is, and will remain, a key component of security strategy. In addition to maintaining a robust homeland defence and strengthening regional defences the BMDR makes it clear that a central component of the Obama BMD plan will be to enlist international cooperation for US BMD efforts. A likely effect of this approach will 22 be the greater acceptance of BMD as a legitimate and key part of US security strategy. The NPR also makes it clear that the Administration sees an ever-increasing role for BMD in US homeland and extended deterrence. Although developments in politics, technology and the ballistic missile threat will inevitably condition and shape the future of BMD, there is much to suggest that missile defence will continue to become further entrenched in US and international security thinking, especially if BMD co-operation can be successfully pursued with Russia. Consequently, whilst changes in future dynamics could mean that fewer assets are deployed than have been stated, the opposite is also true. The Obama Administration certainly has not ruled out changing and upgrading this strategy if circumstances change. Either way it seems ballistic missile defence is alive and thriving under Barack Obama. NOTES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 John R Bolton, ³Obama¶s next 3 years´, Commentary Magazine, 7 January 2010. http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfm/obama-s-next-three-years-15314. When funding to acquire Patriot PAC-3 and MEADS systems ± programmes which are not run directly by the Missile Defense Agency ± is added to the budget request it approaches around $10bn annually. See ³Historical funding for the Missile Defense Agency´, http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/histfunds.pdf, [Accessed 15th Jan 2011]. The Safeguard BMD system was briefly deployed in 1975 but was closed shortly after ± it relied on the Sprint and Spartan missile¶s which would defeated incoming warheads by exploding its own nuclear warheads above the atmosphere to protect the ICBM complex at Grand Forks Airforce base in North Dakota. For more on Safeguard and other US BMD efforts see Ernest J Yanarella, ³The missile defense controversy: technology in search of a mission´, (Kentucky, The University Press of Kenturky: 2002); or Richard Burns & Lester Brune, ³The quest for missile defenses 1944-2003´, (California, Regina Books: 2003). Michael Cooper, ³US candidates use Iran¶s missile tests as a chance for a foreign policy debate´, New York Times, 10 July 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/10/us/politics/10candidates.html. See Wade Boese, ³Anti-missile system uncertainly grows´, Arms Control Today, December 2008, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_12/anti-missile. ³Presidential Q&A: President-elect Barack Obama´, Arms Control Today, December 2008, http://www.armscontrol.org/2008election. See ³Remarks by President Obama´, Hradcay Square, Prague, Czech Republic, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 5 April 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-PresidentBarack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/ [Accessed 7 August 2010]. Jeffrey Taylor, ³Medvedev spoils the party´, The Atlantic Online, 14 November 2008, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/11/medvedev-spoils-the-party/7130/ [Accessed 4 August 2010]. 23 See for example Andrew Futter & David H Dunn, ³Where now for ballistic missile defence: opportunities and constraints for the Obama administration´, World Defence Systems, Vol. 1 2009 pp. 119-24. 11 Peter Baker, ³Obama offered deal to Russia in secret letter´, New York Times, 3 March 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/washington/03prexy.html. 12 Frank Gaffney Jr. ³Missile defense misjudgment´, Center for Security Policy Online Publications, Washington DC, 22 June 2009, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/p18102.xml. 13 Michael Turner, ³Obama¶s gutless missile defense policy´, The Washington Times, 31 January 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jan/31/obamas-gutless-missile-defense-policy/. 14 Jenny Shin, ³Overview of Fiscal Year 2010 ballistic missile defense budget request´, Center for Defense Information, Washington DC, 20 May 2009, http://worldsecurityinstitute.org/temp/Missile%20Defense%20Budget%20Request%20FY10.pdf. 15 ³Republican efforts to restore funding for missile defense blocked´, The American Chronicle, 22 June 2009, http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/107191. 16 Ibid. 17 John Liang, ³Sen. Kyl slams DOD¶s proposed missile defense emphasis shift´, Inside Missile Defense, Vol. 15 No. 8, 22 April 2009; and ³Pentagon officials point out flaws in missile defense programs´, Center for Defense Information, Washington DC, 5 June 2009, http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=4516. 18 Jenny Shin, ³Overview of Fiscal Year 2010 ballistic missile defense budget request´, Center for Defense Information, 20 May 2009, http://worldsecurityinstitute.org/temp/Missile%20Defense%20Budget%20Request%20FY10.pdf. 19 Jim Wolf & Andrea Shalal-Esa, ³US defense plan kills programs, trims missile shield´, Reuters, 6 April 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/04/06/us-pentagon-budget-idUSTRE5353Z320090406, and ³Pentagon officials point out flaws in missile defense programs´, Center for Defense Information, 5 June 2009, http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=4516. 20 Andrea Shalal-Esa, ³Gates takes aim at arms programs; Congress fights back´, Reuters, 6 April 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/04/07/us-pentagon-budget-change-idUSTRE53600520090407. 21 Michael O¶Hanlon, ³Star wars retreats? Rethinking missile defense in Europe´, foreignaffairs.com, 23 September 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65420/michael -ohanlon/star-wars-retreats. 22 See, for example, Baker Spring, ³Two plus two equals five: the Obama administrations missile defense plans don¶t add up´, The Heritage Foundation Web Memo 2624, Washington DC, 23 September 2009, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/09/two-plus-two-equals-five-the-obama-administrationsmissile-defense-plans-do-not-add-up. 23 The proposal was known as the third site because it would complement the long-range interceptor missiles already deployed in Alaska and California. For more on this see Walter Slocombe, ³Europe, Russia and American missile defence´, Survival, Vol. 50 No. 2 2008, pp. 19-24. 24 ³Fact sheet on US missile defense policy ± a µphased, adaptive approach¶ for missile defense in Europe´, Washington, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 17 September 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FACT-SHEET-US-Missile-Defense-Policy-A-PhasedAdaptive-Approach-for-Missile-Defense-in-Europe/ [Accessed 8 August 2010]. 25 ³White House debuts four phase plan for European missile defense´, Global Security Newswire, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090918_6433.php, 18 September 2009. 26 For more on the AEGIS/ SM-3 programmes see http://www.mda.mil/system/aegis_bmd.html. 27 ³Fact sheet on US missile defense policy ± a µphased, adaptive approach¶ for missile defense in Europe´, Washington, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 17 September 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FACT-SHEET-US-Missile-Defense-Policy-A-PhasedAdaptive-Approach-for-Missile-Defense-in-Europe/. 28 At the time of writing no agreement has been reached but discussions over missile launch data sharing and the use of Russian radar around the Caucuses were underway. 29 Steven Hildreth & Carl Ek, ³Long-range ballistic missile defense in Europe´, Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, 23 September 2009, pp. i, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34051.pdf. 30 ³White House debuts four phase plan for European missile defense´, Global Security Newswire, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090918_6433.php, 18 September 2009. 31 Peter Baker, ³White House scraps Bush¶s approach to missile shield´, New York Times, 18 September 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/world/europe/18shield.html. 32 Cole Harvey, ³Obama shifts gears on missile defense´, Arms Control Today, October 2009, pp. 19-21. 33 Peter Baker, ³White House scraps Bush¶s approach to missile shield´, New York Times, 18 September 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/world/europe/18shield.html. 10 24 Robert Gates, ³A better missile defense for a safer Europe´, New York Times, 19 September 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/20/opinion/20gates.html; also, Peter Baker, White House scraps Bush¶s approach´, op. cit. 35 David Wright & Lisbeth Gronlund, ³Technical flaws in the Obama missile defense plan´, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 23 September 2009, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/technical-flaws-theobama-missile-defense-plan. 36 Robert Gates, ³A better missile defense for a safer Europe´, New York Times, 20 September 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/20/opinion/20gates.html. 37 ³White House debuts four phase plan for European missile defense´, Global Security Newswire, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090918_6433.php, 18 September 2009. 38 Adapted from ³Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report ´, Washington, US Department of Defense, February 2010 pp. iii-v. 39 Ibid, pp. 15-6. 40 Ibid, pp. 24. 41 Ibid, pp. v-vi. 42 Ibid, pp. 47-8. 43 ³US interceptors planned for Romania by 2015´, Global Security Newswire, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100209_4015.php, 9 February 2010; also ³Bulgaria to talk with U.S about missile defense´, Global Security Newswire, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100216_2928.php, 16 February 2010. 44 For more on NATO¶s Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence System see http://www.tmd.nato.int/; also Michael Taverna, ³Anti-missile initiative edges forward slowly´, Aviation Week, 16 February 2010, http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/awst/2010/02/15/ AW_02_15_2010_p31-203662.xml. 45 ³Ballistic missile defense review report´, op. cit., pp. 31-2. 46 Robert Golan-Vilella, ³NATO Approves Expanded Missile Defense´, Arms Control Today, December 2010, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_12/NATO_MissileDefense. 47 ³Missile defense deployments ramped up around Iran´, Global Security Newswire, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100201_8723.php, 1 February 2010. 48 ³UAE said close to buying US Antimissile system´, Global Security Newswire, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100604_5826.php, 4 June 2010. 49 ³ µRegional missile defense¶ planned against North Korea, US official says´, Global Security Newswire, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100308_7658.php, 8 March 2010. 50 Amy Butler, ³MDA budget continues Aegis, Thaad focus´, Aviation Week, 2 February 2010, http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/asd/2010/02/02/1 6.xml. 51 Michael Turner, ³Obama¶s gutless missile defense policy´, The Washington Times, 3 January 2010. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jan/31/obamas-gutless-missile-defense-policy/. 52 ³Administration reiterates commitment not to trade away missile defense´, Nukes of Hazard, Blogspot for the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Washington DC, 3 February 2010, http://nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2010/2/3/122722/4940. 53 See ³Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on measures for the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms´, signed 8 April 2010, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf. 54 Robert Gates, ³The case for the New START Treaty´, Wall St Journal, 13 May 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703339304575240164048611360.html. 55 See Michael O¶Hanlon, ³A skeptics case for nuclear disarmament´, Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press: 2010 pp. 134-141. 56 See, for example, Nikolai Sokov, ³Missile Defence: Towards Practical Cooperation with Russia´, Survival, Vol. 52 No. 4, 2010 pp. 121-130. 57 ³Russia, NATO begin discussing European missile shield´, Global Security Newswire, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100521_2424.php, 21 May 2010. 58 Tom Collina, ³Russia, US working on joint launch notification´, Arms Control Today, July/ August 2010. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_07/JointLaunch. 59 ³NATO, Russia Plan Meeting on Missile Defense Collaboration´, Global Security Newswire, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110112_9412.php, 12 January 2011. 34 25