Does Anything hold the Universe together?

Does Anything Hold the Universe Together? Author(s): Helen Beebee Source: Synthese, Vol. 149, No. 3, Metaphysics in Science (Apr., 2006), pp. 509-533 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20118748 Accessed: 22/03/2010 10:10 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Synthese. http://www.jstor.org HELEN BEEBEE DOES ANYTHING HOLD THE UNIVERSE TOGETHER? 1. REGULARITY One diation too have of the hallmarks of come entities under that from attack of our THEORIES OF CAUSATION traditional are deemed has been the repu empiricism or to be mysterious, ineffable that reach. Purported entities experiential from empiricist include universals, quarters the unobservable immaterial entities postulated substances, by scien One purported tific theories, and even the material world. feature the world empiricist experience of any of far removed of able our that has often been principles of the external a connection idea of any is causation. to fall foul of respect thought Hume that famously argued us with world does not furnish any cause and He connection. effect; hence we concluded that: force, proportioned and sup objects, with which any of we no have really any clear and 'impression' cannot have WTien to any pose, these distinct we talk between such ... as endowed a power or with any being we of a necessary connexion betwixt effect; speak an efficacy or energy, that this connexion upon depends so apply'd, are endowed; in all these objects expressions, when and make use 162). only of common words, meaning, determinate ideas' without (1978, What was the hard-line of empirical respectability that binds the goings-on themselves. gies presented causation ity' was because It's all The to do, given the (alleged) lack empiricist as something of the concept of causation, in the universe strate together? Two basic was to shun the concept One of simply all together. Thus Russell that 'the law of causal claimed 4a relic of a bygone like the monarchy, age, surviving, only to do no harm' it is erroneously (1913, 1). And, supposed in similar vein, Jack Smart is very fond of saying, 'Causation? Pah! right for plumbers and brain surgeons!'. I take it, is that the concept behind both of remarks, point in everyday to get by, but causation is one we employ life in order we if we had enough it's one which, scientific (unlike knowledge, actual brain and plumbers) would be able to avoid. And, surgeons Synthese (2006) 149: 509-533 DOI 10.1007/s 11229-005-0576-2 ? Springer 2006 510 HELEN BEEBEE I suppose, the thought is that we would be able to avoid it because - or the language at least the language of science of fundamental use of the concept does not make of causation. physics one thinks of that view, Whatever true that there it's certainly was in the 20th century when long period large numbers of philosophers made ever, to the con every effort not to appeal, van Inwagen for example, Thus, says of 'cause' cept of causation. that which it is a 'horrible I for one refuse little word', and adds: is a morass in 'Causation to set foot. Or not unless I am pushed' (1983, it a 'truly obscure' of the concept (1986, 5). Much literature on Hume's all our the problem of fundamental induction insight provides that causa a fairly calls 65). Earman twentieth century another tion example. Despite lies at the heart of of that literature fact, much from 'all observed Fs have been thought abandoning to do with each anything much to do tively the 'reasonings' concentrates Gs' that other. to causation matters of concerning solely on the inference and are Gs\ thus induction effec have 'all Fs ever using without the Unfortunately, trying philosophy of causation is practically need concept impossible: philosophers as do plumbers the concept and brain every bit as much surgeons. Consider appeal erence, to the huge range of fruitful philosophical causation: and we have causal theories of action knowledge; and so on, we would not functionalist and on. If we even be able theories theories that do of many over the last few that have shaped analytic philosophy to Russell I think it's fair to say that decades. Overall contrary of causation than harm. the concept does more good What the traditional needs, then, is not an avoidance empiricist the theories strategy to show be but that an analysis. What she needs in using the term 'causation' to do, in other words, we are not claiming is to consequentialism; talk in philosophy, ref perception, of the mind; to use causal refused to formulate to some mysterious, referring at all, but of the world feature And so we theories come of fact to what causation. about this ineffable, empirically unrespectable to something that passes the empir as 'reg be broadly characterised theorists take it to be a Regularity by regu point, they seek our well with tolerably causes what. The purpose of starting inoffensive account of that it is pervaded icist credibility test (whatever that might be). might ularity' brute, primitive the universe larities, and, from to define causation common-sense regularity theories rather unpromising in a way that meshes intuitions is to give about what an ontologically DOES ANYTHING HOLD THE UNIVERSE TOGETHER? what 511 to anything mys that does not appeal is: an account causation or ineffable. In particular, theories do not require terious regularity come under that might the heading of there to be anything broadly 'natural necessity', or irreducible everyday The term (and philosophical) a broad church. Hume theory' encompasses 'regularity to the traditional it (or at least, he did according interpre one event of Hume): for Hume-as-traditionally-interpreted, truly be said with to cause another event events B if A temporally to B} and prior events similar the light went similar is contiguous to A are 'con the switch that powers causal or dispositions, to be claims in order true. for our started tation A could with stantly happened going and conjoined' to B. My on, together flicking with caused the light to go on just in virtue of the fact that the flicking just before the fact switch-flickings (of a certain kind) are invariably followed by lights on. in this narrow reason last that sense are have long been out of extensional theories Regularity favour for the simple In the ly inadequate. kind causation quoting Hume object lowed had of analysis trace Hume: defined has back been they hopelessly 25 years or so, the single most popular counterfactual. Counterfactual theories of Lewis's 'Causation'. Lewis starts by to David causation twice over. He all wrote the "we may define a cause to be an followed by objects not been, the second and where by another, to the second similar never had .Or, to similar objects, in other words, where, (Lewus, 1986a, are fol the first, if the first object 1975, 76) existed'. 159; Hume, theories that broadly follow the first regularity in line with instead a counterfactual definition, analysis, the second But the Humean definition.1 spirit of Lewis's analysis cuts a lot deeper to sug than the mere fact that Hume happened gest the idea that of causation marries make terms, with analyses which together So for Lewis in counterfactual be understood might his counterfactual of causation analysis Lewis of despairs and offers counterfactuals the counterfactual a more sophisticated was and laws of nature, themselves, on regularities. at bottom, causation depend, of causation should be seen simply as analysis version of the original regularity theory Lewis the really a regularity in count is grounded on c if and only if e if and only if, had to displace. (successfully) attempting is Lewis's of causation Why analysis for Lewis, causal ory? Well, dependence e causally erfactual dependence: depends counterfactually depends on c, which is to say, 512 c not HELEN BEEBEE e would not have occurred. What makes this count occurred, true is that e does not occur at the closest possible erfactual world(s) c does not occur. Closeness dit which of worlds is determined by to know which If we want out of world A and world B similarity. is closest similar the to world to C. And C, the answer is: whichever on of A and B is most in turn depends two basic features: similarity of particular 1 is fact' and the laws of nature. So world to world 2 to the extent at world similar 1 what happens that, first, at world the same as what happens is exactly world 2; and, second, 'matters l's laws are The final as the same of a as world the jigsaw 2's laws (Lewis, 1979). piece Lewis has the that regularity theory of laws of lawhood 'best-system' (sometimes analysis are those the laws of nature 'Ramsey-Lewis view'): is Lewis's an of truths that achieve systems of simplicity and strength', the can where on the arrangement 'seem to supervene of safely into those of nature. known regularities unexcelled didate The 'buy combination regularities qualities' (1986, xi). here is that there is no natural (or indeed point necessity in Lewis's account other kind of necessity) of how the any anywhere are. His analysis actual world is, or how any of its close neighbours an attempt to show how that basic ontological of causation is story true. of our causal claims' very many being or so since Lewis's paper was pub thirty years original a large philosophical to there has been devoted lished, industry more more and counterfactual theories of causation, crit baroque is consistent In the with icisms come of those those has and theories, While criticisms. further there refinements have been to over designed in the other themes of been causation, this, I about more count course, funda natu literature think, the dominance or counterfactual analyses concerning one. What has been the dominant of less exclusively erfactual analysis this is an interesting is that it is concerned this particular theme with the issue of whether any particular is extensionally Of of causation adequate. issue: if one has a conception of to which there the is no mental important nature of the universe according - no ral necessity ultimate power or force in the nature of objects inherent somehow to show how one that conception is consistent an analysis. does that by providing sation. And issue to be addressed, and fundamental is a more of whether ity theory serves the fundamental is a viable purpose metaphysical one in the first place. or bringing-about that is then one really ought the existence with of cau there However, that is the issue that any regular DOES ANYTHING HOLD THE UNIVERSE TOGETHER? What I want to ask 513 or not there in this paper, then, is whether reasons are any good to believe that Lewis's fundamental project The claim that is hopeless. of natural the repudiation necessity are just hopeless is one that has been pressed theories regularity Strawson. by Galen voked much by way task the cal Strawson's have his objections To my knowledge, a response from regularity of theorists; such a response. is to provide claim natural about regularity is not necessity such of and theories a serious not pro and my that in this paper central of is simply repudiation option. ous tension whose According our with of to Strawson, orderliness conception powers; of what seriously. Lewis does not understanding is not a 'fluke', as enduring objects story ourselves a repudiation as the universe is incompatible that possess philosophi is in seri something our with real causal so much taken who and no ontological we ordinarily take himself (so is a classic things that rides roughshod to know deserves over to be theorist of tal objection extraordinarily is concerned: world verse supervenes bits point-sized (1986, class-nominalist far as I know) that Strawson presses. austere fundamental of a regularity example even consider the kind Lewis claims fundamen to him, according on the arrangement and even This (And 'qualities' is Lewis's ontology, the entire of of an to be defending so far as the actual nature of the uni of matter, x). qualities relations, spatio-temporal those point-sized bits of is to be understood of 'Humean in matter here thesis terms.) summed nience', up in the vast mosaic of local matters and low' then another to our so on (1986, intuitions ordinary superve 'all there is to the world is a slogan, of particular fact, just one little thing to be, sensitive ix). Yet he is, or claims a 'commonsensical fel calls himself (he (1986, xi)): his are supposed the nature of these tere ontology the other there's going the nature of of on and of the mind, of laws, of causation theories, to what we ordinarily to do justice take to be - to an aus things. But this dual commitment hand and to common where sense one's intuitions on one. With a point of ontology, of conception con from the common-sense be seen as the claim that, in that kind the one is a highly unstable to come to have the universe central ception. the case be taken to claim Strawson's causation, pulls apart claim can to the two is too extreme the gap between I shall argue that while Strawson be right may seriously. the regularity theorist's and common that the gap between 514 HELEN BEEBEE of the universe exists, it is a gap sense's conceptions of the nature we can learn to live with. 2. CAUSATION I shall briefly ditional introduce sketching Strawson's his WITH A CAPITAL 'C to objections of Hume. interpretation Hume that believed interpretation, was in the objects' to There sation is, to be sure, more regularity. our concept than that; it really is part of our concept of causation their effects. But when Hume of causation that causes necessitate traced the origins he found concluded the con in experience of our concept of necessary in the world for that concept to latch on nothing was no more that necessary connection than a our impression the idea from one object thoughts a of the cause produces of to another' transition in theories regularity by tra On the standard, to 'cau all there was nection, to, and (1978, sion 'determination 165): from to carry the mind to the belief that the effect will follow, and the impres which from that connection derives is an necessary - no transition. We thus have no idea impression arising as Strawson of any con contentful puts it 'positively conception', 'in the objects', since the idea of necessary nection connection does not come Strawson sation from impression of such a connection. between causation (small distinguishes any 'C'), the latter being denies: the thing Strawson 'C') and Cau whose existence uses term the that term be that can (capital Hume-as-traditionally-interpreted as to function 'Causation' substituted Hume of uses in some for as any terms of that 'a completely terms the other purport general ('power', energy', to refer to causation etc.) conceived Strawson, the world essentially Causation in virtue (1989, 84). For non-Regularity-Theory way' nature is that feature of 'the fundamental of of which the world Hume is regular never really in its behaviour' denied the exis (ibid.). On tence Strawson's of Causation; its true nature. According about Causation is that den from us of interpretation, he was just to know about any claims sceptical to Strawson's all we can ever know Hume, is hid its nature it gives rise to regularities; positively is not contentful in question. the idea the conception Hume allowed of a we can form no (again, because But the existence of Causation it). that we have a 'relative' whose idea of Causation existence something-we-know-not-what guarantees DOES ANYTHING HOLD THE UNIVERSE TOGETHER? orderliness that we The 'water' are of nature and held that it is that thing causal Causation talk. kind terms we 515 - to in our really referring Strawson draws here analogy and 'gold'. The nominal as water of water the reference of nominal we would reference (Of ordinary is with natural of water, like iden essence by which tasteless, tify samples not determine ple) which What whatever chemical stuff could (wet, colourless, 'water': something essence and yet ordinarily of 'water' have water's (XYZ, fail to be water etc.) does for exam case, of course, the determines that may be. misidentify is water's real (in it as water). real essence essence refer to is its the composition about it actually refers to even if we turned out to be wrong - or if we had no view at all about chemical water's composition use of the term essence might its real what be.) The legitimate 'water' thus does of view essence. to Strawson, of causation, according it is in the world is whatever 'C') (capital the is analogous. that underlies not conception its nominal Hume's Causation or generates ful conception its real depend essence; on our all we a positively contentful having of need is such a conception course, we think the 'water' would But H2O. still we have no positively content While regularities. con we do have a positively of Causation, contentful rise to, namely of what it gives regularities. Regularities ception as water's nomi for causal claims form the evidential basis (just essence claims), forms but the evidential those causal basis claims on which themselves we make ordinarily are about Causa nal water tion the universe holds together. they are about whatever - or to be clear on what, Causation is is important exactly, - on to do Strawson's it is supposed rather, what (and Strawson's the desire for between view. Simon Blackburn distinguishes Hume's) a 'straitjacket on a 'causal nexus' for and the desire what he calls It course be 'a further the possible of nature'. A causal nexus would two particular succession fact than (mere) regular events] [between ... a a fact making or connection, it so that when the dependency must happen' A causal nexus first happens the second (2000, 103). between relation obtain thus be a singular would events, whose ing would events of does more ... may suppose want not the conceptually same kinds this: our a gaze further will or metaphysically be similarly guarantee related. A that other 'straitjacket' than we there shift to the whole fact than to be course of nature. Again, ongoing mere We succession. feel regular we that 516 the ongoing it does. pattern We want the would be HELEN BEEBEE too much of a coincidence unless there is some thing in virtue of which the world has had and is going to go on having the order that cause, 'on which or principle, some to be some secret there spring course and succession of objects regular totally is whatever it is that ensures the continuation of the inductive vertigo that arises when we think ultimate depends' the natu events 1975, 55). This (Hume ral order, that dispels how might fall apart. (2000, Causation 103) is (as will nature'; he believed of become and clear later) a 'straitjacket it is this, he claims, that that we refer to it in our causal take our as causal their talk Strawson's the possible Hume believed talk. As I said the on course in, and in section point talk about thought something theories 1, regularity not that we should take ineffable starting to be or mysterious or too far removed Hume reach. We can now see why Strawson's from our experiential is not a regularity theorist: for him, causation is is, Causation) (that - we can have no positively indeed ineffable contentful conception of it but causal talk is, nonetheless, talk about it, and not about regularities. Strawson's are It may central (not to put charge against too fine a point on that anyone It regularity it) 'absurd': ever have theories is that they seem extraordinary should ... held the view that there is definitely world no 'because' of which in nature; it is regular. that there is definitely is certainly one of nothing the most about the in virtue baroque metaphysical suggestions ever put forward (principally by people who pride them selves on dispensing with metaphysical extravagance). (1989, 86-7) According a clear whether [regularity to sense, or not [regularity a complete there there the ..., theories] and continuous is any reason is definitely for of the world's regularity It's not that fluke. just it no in the nature for it of in reason behaviour we don't is, in know theories], to According things. the nature of things. (1989, 21) The objection in asserting regularity no reason from shoot: into to [regularity theories] that ... of there it is absurd ... is no to is that the theory is utterly reason say regularity is typical claim claim about about in to the insist rather nature that than of implausible categorically of the world in the nature moment a strict and to moment. empiricist spectacular things why a view Such for the things there is definitely ... occurs chaos anti-realist over flowers (1989, epistemological metaphysical dogmatically we what the can observe of things. a vast nature 21-22) Strawson's there is any that theories is that (1) regularity then, claim, deny reason and that (2) this of the world, for the regularity DOES ANYTHING HOLD THE UNIVERSE TOGETHER ? is absurd. that In the rest of this section do not but entail the that I shall that examine there 517 regularity tence of I discuss none of theories regularity of the world, such a reason various them (1). I shall argue no reason for the is to be committed denial of the exis (contingent) is something that regularity theorists ought to anyway. I turn to (2) in Sections 3 and 4, where versions of the absurdity and argue that charge is convincing. sense do regularity theories deny that there is a reason for a super the regularity of the world? Well, theories embody regularity that causal venience facts supervene claim about causation, namely In what on non-causal facts, or on what 1, especially Carroll calls a 'wholesome theories base' 1994, Chapter in a fundamental 3-12). Regularity put of 'distinct existences' (facts, events, regions or whatever) just one little thing and in various and they claim, different put it ontology (see their his faith of space-time qualities as Lewis then another, ways, that causal facts Regularity in particular theories Lewis's tingent supervenience but to the necessary in Lewis's case, might, project to his on that wholesome base. supervene of causation, and conceived traditionally - are not just to the con committed analysis of the causal facts on the wholesome base, of the former on the latter. This supervenience seem is, he claims, characterised supervenience, overall metaphysical Lewis's surprising. an attempt to show that the thesis of Humean earlier, is tenable. (See the introduction is even more but that I shall if Hu is 1986, especially ix-xi.) (Humean supervenience austere than wholesome-base ontologically supervenience, treat them as roughly here.) But he claims equivalent mean is true, it is at best contingently supervenience true. He quite happy with exist at other according Given tempted causation the idea that things like immaterial substances a philosophical he just wants worlds; possible theory to which they don't exist in the actual world. one might this overarching be ambition, philosophical to suppose that Lewis thinks that the supervenience of on the wholesome laws of nature and base is similarly a contingent matter: at there's non-supervenient causation merely not to be any other possible worlds all right, but there just happens in the actual world. Which is to say, there are other possible worlds on mere not supervene where causation does but is some regularity, basic: thing more ontologically damental fabric of the universe. Now, gently perhaps supervene this on position the wholesome something that base that is a part of the fun causation and laws contin is a tenable philosophical 518 HELEN BEEBEE position; and indeed, I think some philosophers not it is one or hold it. But I do think that Lewis any standard himself, regularity reason could plausibly be said to hold. The is that what theorist, in both his counterfactual Lewis offers of causation and analysis his best-system of lawhood and what theorists analysis regularity in general offer is a piece of straightforward, tradi traditionally tional and and The counterfactual of causation conceptual analysis. analysis of lawhood the best-system necessary analysis together provide sufficient conditions not for the obtaining of causal relations all possible but across worlds. those And just at the actual world, concern more and sufficient conditions necessary nothing ontologi than mere cally basic regularities. - as I just said It is to hold in that causation open to someone on no more than mere but that it does not fact depends regularity, so depend one might at all possible worlds. For example, hold that in fact, at the actual world, there is nothing the universe holding so that causation here is just regularity, but that at other together, worlds possible at those worlds, that causation is Causation does hold the universe and that, something together, one might that is causation. other words, hold (In at the actual world, is regularity but that causation where Causation exists.) I shall not explore of at worlds theorists facts on that possibility regularity the causal Does there in this paper; instead I shall take it for granted that are committed the wholesome that regularity to the necessary base. supervenience it follow or is 'definitely' it depends larity? Well, If one means then the answer is no. Regularity cally'. 'necessarily', at any possible theories if there is anything entail only that, world, that is the reason for the universe's then that thing is not regularity, In any possible causation. the causal facts (if there are any) world, are determined ence, or not, in a way that of anything or absence the presence of such features, whatever regularities; to do with what thus has nothing causal facts there are. are, On Strawson's a reason and view, for hence of course, Causation is just would is completely of the pres independent or underwrite that might lie behind those so conceived, that entail theories, no reason for the world's regu 'categorically' one means or 'categori what by 'definitely' they as defined whatever it is (if it exists) that underwrites the world's the regularities. So, for by definition called 'causa Strawson, be Causation obviously being to describe the regularity the therefore be tempted tion'. One might or not of Causation thus: 'the existence has nothing orist's position regularity would merit DOES ANYTHING HOLD THE UNIVERSE TOGETHER? to do with what the causal facts are'. And course that does the sound 519 like a theorist since she to make. But of claim very peculiar to having her view characterised will object regularity in this way, The slogan like an will object to the assumption universe tion truth together merits (capital but that whatever 'Causation'. (if anything) holds the 'Causa the name is causation' sounds 'C'), if it exists, analytic it is not, for the slogan that 'Cau takes it for granted name holds the universe is an appropriate for that which sation' that the regularity theorist will and that is something together we call whatever it is that holds all, by what right do deny. After the universe together 'Causation', when we can have no positively contentful conception of what that thing is like? 2.1. Does the Ordinary of Causation Reach Concept Beyond Regularity? So far we do not have of a 'vast and claim spectacular metaphysical Instead, we have a claim about - a claim to the effect that the Hume about the nature the meaning of the term does not (contrary to whatever referentially exists). ordinary, beyond the concept with Strawson has at all. things' term 'causation' to what reach out held) holds the universe (if such a thing together on this semantic two possible lines of attack Strawson's concept hence wrong. I shall take of causation the The take does in fact reach out claim. One is straightforwardly to insist (as in fact he does) that the common-sense mere regularities; of causation kind terms. does theorist regularity simply gets other is to justify the analogy each objection in turn. the ordinary natural Strawson of cau concept a simplistic sation reg Criticising regularities. ... event A caused to which 'to say that view, according ularity ... event B is another A ... and that simply to say that B succeeded ... succeeded events of type A are regularly events by (contiguous) certainly out beyond reaches it that of type ?' (1987, 254), Strawson says: Such that a Regularity there is no theory 'because' of causation one could in strong express loosely contrast with it as our the view in nature stands ordinary view. And I take it that it is our (science-enriched) ordinary view of causation that provides the basis at least for the main philosophical rival to the Regularity view, which I shall call the 'Producing Causation' view ... (ibid.) According say that one to the 'Producing ... event A caused Causation' another ... view, event Strawson B is simply says, 'to to say 520 HELEN BEEBEE that A (i) produced or gave rise to or brought about and (ii) necessi tated the occurrence of B: or constitution, and or constitutions natures and cannot but intrinsic nature object has a certain the intrinsic it is in virtue of objects having that they do have that they act and react, each in which react, in the regular ways they do' then claims that the regularity theorist must deny (1987, 255). He or 'give rise to' their effects - at least in the that causes 'produce' senses of these terms (see his 1987, 256). Thus - given that ordinary the ordinary of causation is the Producing Causation view, concept and given that the regularity the relevant terms) endorse are at odds with theories ity Given of that Strawson's his theorist cannot the Producing the ordinary here is well view, regular of causation. concept is with a very simplistic kind made: I think the is a conceptual on the one on the other. the gap hand regular between and the the (without Causation reinterpreting act and concern theory, point regularity to accept that there ity theorist ought an instantiation of a regularity being or giving-rise-to of production relation issue is much less clear-cut once we ity theory and consider Lewis's counterfactual a counterfactual However, abandon analysis. argued, is a sophisticated of causation reg analysis does not fall foul of the that analysis theory; and, arguably, ularity of count For Lewis, causation is a matter gap objection. conceptual of 5's and it is far from clear that the notion erfactual dependence; simplistic As I have regular on A is not sufficiently close to the ordi counterfactually depending or giving-rise-to. of producing nary notion Lewis's Strawson that, natural-necessity might given reply on account it is for B to counterfactually of what depend shunning itself turns out to be the notion of counterfactual A, dependence too deflationary or giving-rise-to. to capture the ordinary concept such a response however, Clearly, in its favour. fully of production some requires argument positive for Strawson since it is undeniable In any case, a problem remains, to refer to causal claims do not purport that at least some ordinary If a about absences. causal claims relation, any underlying namely fails to rescue a drowning swimmer, lifeguard wilfully that failure as a cause of the drowning. narily count sue for negligence, swimmer's successfully family might cess in court would there be the failure by absence, sity could was depend a cause of is no we would ordi (The drowned and their suc that in part on the prosecution arguing But in cases of causation the drowning.) neces some sort of natural sense in which into the picture. There can be no thought to enter DOES ANYTHING HOLD THE UNIVERSE TOGETHER.> relation of making-happen there is no 'action' commitment 521 cases; that the common-sense an automatic or bringing-about or producing in such one object on another. And this suggests of of causation is not one that enshrines concept to anything like natural necessity, or to that-in-virtue-of-which-the-universe-is-regular.2 to grant Strawson's that that we were claim however, our common-sense intu do not fully endorse theories regularity the fact that the of causation the nature itions about (and ignore Suppose, it follow view does not do so either). Does Causation Producing one holds if that be abandoned? that regularity theories must Only is required of a philosophical the ordinary with concept alignment case of causation. or in the particular in general either analysis most But such a claim is extremely implausible. Arguably philosoph ical progress revision were the mind involves off a degree of conceptual revision; it would be illegitimate the agenda, immaterial substance (or indeed an or are if conceptual to deny that is an to deny that colours sort), for example, or to deny that causation must In each of objects, be deterministic. were one might that the abandoned intuitions case, of course, argue or never or colour, of mind, of the ordinary concept really part in the first place. One might that the view causation argue instead or that colour is a substance, is an intrinsic property, that the mind or that causation nomenon was merely a belief about the phe is deterministic, in question that turned out (by most lights) philosophers' on what to be false, rather than a requirement it is to be a mind, or coloured, or causally related. But then the same can be argued in the case the universe's If the claim of the belief that causation is the underlying reason for regularity. that causation of any object intrinsic properties on no more at bottom than depends the ordinary of causation concept regularity really is in tension with about above), then even so, we should (a claim that I raised doubts a not take that fact to fatally undermine theories. That regularity as they were leave our ordinary beliefs philosophical theory exactly on that theory's adequacy. is not a necessary condition 2.2. The 'Real Essence' above the that of Causation Strawson theorist's has claim two that possible 'causes' lines does of not I have was attack reach now for I claimed against regularity out referentially to whatever holds the universe dealt with the first line of attack. The second together. line of attack 522 Strawson distinction The tion our that we tive attack for that we HELEN BEEBEE to attempt to justify the claim that a real/nominal can be made in the case of 'causes'. idea here would be essence theories, regularity not appeal should theories. philosophical like this. The general motiva something as we saw in Section 1, is the thought to any ineffable we-know-not-whats in (This is not to say we-know-not-whats; in any attempt them should deny it is only to say that a posi to provide - so But the line of that we there are any ineffable to not appeal should theory that our causal talk goes even granted to Causation, the fact that we do not possess refers a 'positively Strawson of Causation. motivates contentful' concept to an analogy with the standard this claim by appealing (though not about natural kind terms: the reference way of thinking obligatory) of what that the term that there 'water' goes its chemical contentful ral kind like a a crucial composition), real essence concept' is in fact no the real essence of water (i.e. along with even if we are completely about ignorant is that is, we need not have a 'positively that real essence is like. the analogy talk refers I shall with case argue natu a particular about phenomenon.) - a case can be made for the claim of what terms, for 'real essence' point. to are to be made, via the claim that our causal of causation, since Strawson the analogy to anything at breaks down natural of nat like According terms kind ural 'chair' kind - the view that distinctive semantically terms unlike like 'water' in that is presupposing, the reference kind non-natural terms of the kind, the real essence goes along with necessarily essence. to put it another rather than its nominal way, mem (Or, of non bers of a natural kind share a real essence whereas members for the claim that standard not.) The argument a given in this way proceeds term behaves by employ semantically to reveal that are designed thought ing Twin-Earth-type experiments we are our semantic In the case of 'water', for example, intuitions. on Twin Earth that is, to imagine stuff that the watery asked as essence the same nominal stuff that has exactly the Twin-Earth rather than H20. And formula XYZ has the chemical actual water we are supposed to judge stuff is not that the Twin-Earth watery natural kinds do water. The kind a real claim term thus essence that whose 'causation' nature amounts to the claim semantically that, like water, the reference determines behaves like of a natural has 'causation' causation DOES ANYTHING HOLD THE UNIVERSE TOGETHER? all possible worlds. But, as Strawson a real essence not have in that sense: across ... ature' izations' there were 'causation' than is not the word a true 'gold': possible reasons natural-kind for causation which different word. could It 523 does admits, causation is more like the word different natures, in in different different universes why the conceivably had different universes were have basic 'temper 'real so that regular the ways that they were This world (1989, 126). of the hard semantic it now 'real essence' to see how of causation to the actual restriction makes it very on based 'causation' essence. argument erence of nominal, one might a positive provide for the claim that the ref intuitions turns real, rather than by causation's out that, across worlds where the with reference nominal is going of rather 'causation' than real is determined For the lies behind something natural kind terms) (unlike essence. The only possible ble world essence where we have reason at all: no regularities, goes test along case, then, essence nominal for the of course, that there is no case of reference ing the required along is an is mere And, made. regularity Strawson regularity. at such a world causation to be a possi but no real would claim, thus provid with real rather than nominal (or lack of it in this case) going essence. But what we now need that has a world not been where there where case there is no causation. persuasively independent regularity as I have already argument is indeed to the effect a world that argued, 2.3. The Denial Contingent the Universe Together that Something holds So far I have be committed that the traditional theorist need not argued regularity to the claim that there could not be anything holding the universe She is required together. only to think that if there is - at this or any other possible then it is not world any such thing I have argued that that claim causation. And is not at all absurd. a I think, to hold theorist Still, a traditional regularity ought, than just what is required by the terms of the the stronger position to hold further that there is, in fact, no reason for ory: she ought The whole the world's of regularity after theories, regularity. point an analysis of causation to that does not appeal all, is to provide natural would necessity; be if one and believed it is hard to see what necessity the point anyway. in natural of doing The point so of 524 a regularity providing on the claim that we This mitted is not, to the view HELEN BEEBEE to put flesh is, precisely, theory of causation can do without in natural necessity. believing to say that the regularity is com of course, theorist that only those conception be much more She can even things of which we exist. She can happily to the universe that one it all can form a accept than we are capa such entity might, She can that positively there may contentful very well ble of conceiving. be conceivably, concede something that holds together. grant the intelligibility of that supposition even though she cannot form of what such a thing could be like. She sim any positive conception reason to suppose that such a thing does exist, ply sees no positive to ground is required causal that no such entity since she holds facts. 3. IS THERE A REASON WHY The traditional THE UNIVERSE IS REGULAR? to hold that I have argued, theorist, ought regularity no reason why the universe has is regular. Strawson to this view. His first objection this view is three objections against to say to insist of the world, that 'it is absurd, given the regularity no reason in the nature of things why regular that there is definitely ... occurs to moment' from moment rather than chaos (1989, ity in Section 4. I address that objection below, and the others 21-22). ... to say ... that there is in 'it is absurd I take it that 'reason' ' ... no reason to signify is supposed that objective fea definitely for the ture of the world underlies which any (true) explanation there is, in fact, regularity. The distinction and 'reason' 'explana we reason. for the following Suppose con that we can have no positively between it is that holds the universe world's I think, tion' is important, Hume Strawson's agree with of what tentful conception Then we cannot explain why the universe together. since we cannot is regular, characterisation of the purported in principle any positive provide we can do is claim that there is something The most explanans. look like much of an and that does not it all together holding can we is regular. Nor of why the universe (on one explanation an 'explanation' must of what be) thereby claim that understanding an explanation is regular: of why the universe there is, objectively, is something that we do, then we can if we hold that explanation not other claim hand on the one claiming that an explanation hand exists, is in principle that no explanation while on the by graspable DOES ANYTHING HOLD THE UNIVERSE TOGETHER? us. Hence ular: nature the need to talk about even a reason if we the universe 525 why the reason might exist and hence of having universe is regular.3 The not have count regularity theorist any positively as a reason why it feature are incapable in an explanation Hume is reg of grasping its of why that we the can that might anything is regular. And fur she holds ther that given this lack of a positively there contentful conception, an explanation is no possibility of our being able to come up with of the universe. But granted (in the above sense) for the regularity on that no such explanation is possible, it is unclear how holding the universe to the belief is regular that us there in any is any a 'reason' why the universe is, nonetheless, better a philosophical than does position such reason. By hypothesis, no such our 'rea ordi about explanatory are not in the (And practices. least affected by agrees with Strawson's contentful of concept puts that there denying son' can play any part nary explanatory can still explain their causal in our practices this. We Compare a penchant with for conspiracy theories. Concrete theo conspiracy of course, for some historical ries are, events available the shoot Some not for example. theorists hold ing of JFK, conspiracy other historical events whose that there are many unreasonably causes were or not as claimed the media, by politicians, lawyers, we might never in fact get to the bottom of which malign in a given case or how forces were at work precisely One might for example, that Robert believe, they worked. coherently Maxwell's fall from his yacht was no accident, without the having idea how or why his unknown to push murderer slightest managed whoever, though him overboard. never And find of these course things files destroyed, off, MI5's bumped cumstances to light. will never come The believer in a worse she will out: she might that believe coherently the witnesses have been may and so on, so that the true cir even particular phenomena by saying something for example.) history, in something-holding-the-universe-together the belief is in something-holding-the-universe together than our theorist, position forever-ignorant conspiracy even in principle, because there is no possibility, of the reason for - no ever 'coming the universe's to light' of the regularity possibility reason becoming an explanation. She is thus more like a believer in, say, fate or destiny. nificant but in fact trains or whatever The believer inexplicable - are somehow in destiny holds typically events encounters chance explained by that on sig tube that the hypothesis 526 HELEN BEEBEE were to happen'. the events Such a believer has in question 'destined a strong explanatory can be sat that that urge urge, and believes to destiny. It cannot: isfied by appeal the claim that the event was to happen' amounts to no more than the claim that, some 'destined or other, But that is not an explanation for it was no accident. no explanation event In fact, there is it happened. for the in why at least not an explanation of the kind that our believer (or question how in destiny wants). The urge to explain the universe's is, I think, analo regularity no a priori reason to sup gous. The urge exists all right, but there is that it is an urge that can be satisfied. Worse: the lack pose given of a positively contentful of anything the uni conception holding verse to the regularity there is (according every theorist) together, reason to suppose that the explanatory urge cannot be satisfied. The in a 'reason' best one can have is an unspecific belief and such a belief urge. does not, not in itself, seem count as the satisfaction of the explanatory to Strawson's like a very convincing response that it postulate of an adequate ontology objection. then a regular something-in-virtue-of-which-the-universe-is-regular, and the concomitant repu (but contingent) ity theory of causation, This may If one demands cannot theorist's any such entity, satisfy. The regularity to satisfy is not to attempt the demand, but to question response to be satisfied. it is a demand that really needs or deserves whether I claim that we can learn to live with what Blackburn calls inductive diation of 2 above) and hence vertigo (see Section cost the ontological need not be met: worth paying. So far I have the concentrated that the demand of meeting it is not in question a price for But theorist. sug vertigo' regularity - one also think that there is a related epistemic gests prob might a 'fluke', then of the universe lem. If the regularity is, at bottom, Con orderliness of nature isn't the continued extremely surprising? of Strawson's: sider an analogy [Imagine that] a true randomizing pixel second on a cycle a house, goes standard - so that 800 each x 400 pixel to a on an alleged as the phrase explanatory 'inductive problem device determines computer can take screen, any colour the colour value of each running value on for a each ten-times-a 1/10th sec ond period. On enters it were own on the screen it appears walks over stove, regular in an ordered, that there is a film and puts fashion, on a kettle. exactly as showing. A woman Life regularly a world, as as in our world. DOES ANYTHING HOLD THE UNIVERSE TOGETHER? 527 But the image is being generated by the true randomizing device. It is pure fluke that what ordered world, on the happens rather than screen filling appears up with to or tell a coherent story of to a a suddenly switching regular, fizz of points of colour. Strawson's (1989, 24) of course, is that if there really is nothing in point, nature then the fundamental virtue of which the universe is regular, to the story being played out on the of the universe is analogous screen: it's just a continuous fluke that things go on in the computer that they do. orderly way The regularity of theorist view physical point admit that, in a sense, run of luck' (1989, 26). The question Strawson calls an 'outrageous of regularity is whether this is a consequence theories that can be I myself tolerated. think that it can be tolerated. After all, we have runs of luck. Consider, to tolerate learned other outrageous mostly for example, how spectacularly lucky you are to exist at all. It's on Earth have for a long time that conditions extraordinary enough to be, compatible and continue with been, any life at all; the mar for error (climatic of the atmosphere conditions, gins composition so on) are very narrow. But that's not the half of it. Consider and events had to happen how many in order for you to be and how many have been on which occasions there must of your parents have that would future might unwittingly your future have said conceived, either one some I think, accept that from a meta must, one: is a pertinent the analogy she must of nature the continued orderliness is what or done existence in jeopardy. Then put thing to both sets of grandparents, and so on, and go back a generation on. When is an extraordi you think about it, your own existence does this bother fluke. How much Most nary you? likely, not at all. no inclination You to suppose therefore have absolutely probably that out there is some kind out panned other if we situation hand, described the 'film' showing above but knowing that it watching - we was randomly in the way Strawson describes would, produced even be very surprised. We might quite reasonably, that someone has been with the computer tinkering doubt that the 'film' really was thereby randomly question, is more not then, is whether like the second there the case inexplicable regularity than the first. One epistemological start to suspect and program, history On the of underlying in such a way 'reason' why things as to produce you. found ourselves in the through The generated. of the universe reason to think the between is that is a relevant difference 528 regularity displayed screen. Given puter computer what will will be operates, HELEN BEEBEE on and that displayed by the universe we take ourselves what to know about we cannot make the com how the on happen that there will about any predictions possibly our best prediction the screen. (Or rather, sort of jumbled mess be some appearing out of the billions of course we cannot of possi say which though to what we take ourselves ble jumbled messes will appear.) Relative it is extraordinarily is the way Strawson appears In the case of the world, to know, surprising describes. that the image that in fact we take ourselves to know by contrast, in fact, an incredibly of course) that the universe ordered is, (fallibly, or at least did not to know If we did not take ourselves this, place. believe able given entirely it with to do a reasonable anything take that we ^surprising we would not be of confidence, degree at all, and we would all be dead by now. And to know ourselves that about the world, it is that things turn out the way they do. 4. STRAWSON'S INCOHERENCE OBJECTIONS to two objections I turn, finally, that Strawson raises in his 1987. are 'absurd' not sim Both objections that regularity theories allege but in the sense that ply in the sense that they are counter-intuitive, the alleged case, on the one between, incompatibility the kind of realism about objects the exter hand, (or realism about nal world that regularity theorists presuppose, generally) typically internally an from about the existence of a reason for and, on the other, anti-realism of those objects' follow the regularity behaviour. (For simplicity as 'Realism' with I shall refer to the former realism ing Strawson a capital 'R'.) Strawson's first ible with our objection proper is that regularity account of the theories are incompat of matter' they are genuinely incoherence arises incoherent. In each 'taking temporality (1987, 260). He says: Matter, time. And as is essentially that persists conceived, ordinarily something through to possess it is ordinarily certain fundamental supposed unchanging a as it persists to have it is, in other time; words, through supposed stable nature, as it persists through time. matter, But as to pos all ordi properties certain intrinsic, persisting, tulate such non-coincidentally stable, continuant, propertied of existence as nary Realists of forces For whose what erties. ordinarily do, is (in effect) already to have postulated existence (as it were) is part holds of the mode of matter with matter together, something the existence and a its prop (constant) DOES ANYTHING HOLD THE UNIVERSE TOGETHER? nature, from instant to instant? What maintains it as that 529 remains something qualitatively The answer similar from instant to instant? cannot be at all'. For the transtemporal then qualitative 'Nothing cannot is after all entirely and matter after coincidental, similarity stability a (more or nature. to possess all be said less intrinsic So stable), persisting the answer must And the present is that the phrase be, 'Something'. suggestion a name as any for whatever that something forces' is as good is. (1987, 'objective or 260-1) Strawson to instant' about is here where from in the word 'forces'. It trading on an ambiguity ... from instant that forces hold 'matter together as the kinds 'forces' are understood of thing we scientists. is uncontroversial learn I maintain That my bodily integrity to the next from rather than all the atoms that make the room is due to the opera up my body dispersing throughout one to accept of this does not compel tion of forces. But acceptance non in any ultimate, that those forces also 'hold matter together' one moment way. For (according regularity-theory continued of existence and stability more brute regularity. those to the regularity theorist) forces is itself just do indeed maintain similar from that the one mat to there for the regularity forces Thus, theorist, ter as something that 'remains qualitatively instant'; nonetheless, is a sense in which the regularity 'the transtemporal theorist instant will maintain or stabil qualitative similarity to fol But why coincidental'. is it supposed ity is after all entirely cannot low that matter 'a (more or less) after all be said to possess nature'! Strawson here effectively that stable, persisting presupposes a 'stable nature' not simply that it in something's having requires remain unchanged fact to do so. But anteed can ity theorist from moment is, by any from moment this claim insist that can to moment, simply something whose but that the it is guar regular be denied: simply to moment, fact' 'straitjacketing ultimately contingent unchangingness not guaranteed to count as having ingness, between theories regularity as having a 'stable nature'. a There is, admittedly, lurking 'distinct here, which existences' seems not is that deserves, just by dint of its unchang a 'stable nature'. So there is no tension and serious forces our ordinary conception of matter for the regularity theorist worry do not seem to be the kind of vene. What objects it is for to super causal facts are supposed upon which there to be, say, a magnetic two force between to be entirely distinct are from how those objects 530 HELEN BEEBEE to meet with each other. The theorist needs interacting regularity But that (thankfully) this objection. is not my concern here. Recall a causal nexus between Blackburn's distinction and a straitjacket. To admit that forces of are not fully distinct from (but are not reduc ible to) the behaviour of objects subject to them would be to admit the existence thereby admit verse; a causal nexus one moment to the next dence (something the existence like) a causal nexus. But one need not of a reason for the regularity of the uni is something from whose continued operation is, as Blackburn puts crying out that it, 'a case of coinci for explanation and forces 'hold matter or fluke, another contingency inductive (2000, 103). engendering vertigo' The point here is simply that the claim is entirely consistent with there being nothing the together' holding no straitjacket. Whatever we account universe there being together of the nature of forces, the fact that matter has a stable nature give in does not require us to postulate forces' straitjacketing 'objective Strawson's reason The an sense of the term. The there Strawson Realism concerns stable raises on nature of matter to suppose that second objection between is a reason why the universe that is supposed the one hand and gives us no is regular. to reveal regularity nature the parallel of the evidence on the one hand, that supports Realism and the evidence that sup in Strawson's of 'objective the existence forces' ports (understood says: straitjacketing way) on the other. Strawson In fact, of of succession is evidence for the existence regularity experience as experience as a whole in rather the same way is evidence forces objective not the existence It is, perhaps, of an external world of objects. conclusive dence. vacuous world there And [Realist But who that to posit that grant the existence of forces of for evi inconsistency on the other theories is a anyone says objective to to posit well have the existence of an external step may vacuous a vacuous it is not claim that is an equally step. But step. The ... and is a substantive world tables claim is an external chairs, etc.) (of ... are objective case in the same forces is arguably the claim that there regularity or the theorists] cannot say some that that espousing a sation is just good empiricist epistemological dence, beyond or 'meaning-empiricism', evidence' it is arguable such hygiene thing. have, they - not going beyond For in this sense realists of in being regularity theory of cau the evi 'going an about external world of objects, already gone far beyond the (sensory) evidence. A for tiori, they have granted the possible legitimacy of moves of this sort. It may true, and not be provable if there is an that external there world are of forces, of which then. we But have if Realism experience, is as objective objects is at present assumed to be the case, then it is (to put it mildly) likely that there are. (1987, 264^-5) overwhelmingly DOES ANYTHING HOLD THE UNIVERSE TOGETHER? The if we The then the reason do not why this is 'overwhelmingly 531 something postulate of nature would the orderliness idea, one likely' is the familiar the universe holding together, be a huge coincidence. of as later forces' 'objective the existence of calls (1987, have the stands the exter to then, is that the existence we observe in nature regularities to what nal world Strawson stands coherence' something and that of our is posited experience for which in general we cannot and 'constancy In each case, 269). conclusive evidence; serves to explain or underpin the phenomenon something in question. Thus if one is (as the Realist theorist is) a regularity one should also be a realist (as the Realist about the external world, Realist theorist is not) about objective forces. regularity on the alleged parallel between belief hinges in the in objective and belief forces. The right to the objection, I think, is to deny that any such parallel response to the (Realist) exists. According theorist, we can have no regularity Strawson's argument external world 'positively contentful' conception of anything that might hold the universe the claim that there together. As an explanatory hypothesis, is such a thing is, as I argued in Section 3 above, pretty useless: to that there is a reason why the universe claim is not to is regular explain why it is regular. that the external world Strawson able order is concerned Is anything like the same true of the claim not. The kind of Realist exists? Certainly is not whose the kind who existence believes in unknow is somehow with in required nature we is possible but whose experience cannot to conceive. Strawson's Realist believes in an external begin - a world of chairs and tables nature world whose is (by and large) we have at and indeed knowable. conceivable, Moreover, eminently our disposal a huge body of knowledge (from physics, psychology, things-in-themselves, to explain why us with about how it is that that external world furnishes we find ourselves the experiences The existence of the exter having. nal world is an explanatory of extraordinary hypothesis sophistica tion and detail. The belief in something-holding-everything-together, and by contrast, is not. so on) 5. CONCLUSION Strawson's to regularity objections claims: first, that belief in something is rationally of anyone who required theories on two central hinge the universe holding together is a Realist the external about 532 HELEN BEEBEE the name these central to refute 'causation'. claims the I are that that thing deserves and, second, world; for that Strawson's have argued arguments not compelling, that he has failed and hence ories On of causation. the other regularity that there Strawson is right to hold hand, perhaps so - about is something counter-intuitive regular deeply perhaps of any entity that serves to bind the goings theories' repudiation ity on in the universe To the extent that this is so pace together. - no not even an extensionally Lewis theory, adequate regularity in fully capturing will succeed of causation counterfactual analysis of 'cause'. But that in itself does the content of the ordinary concept not make the regu absurd. For theories metaphysically regularity one gets when one that feeling inductive vertigo larity theorist, on the fact that everything too long reflecting may yet fall spends to be cured by ontologi at any moment is not an ailment apart to suffer it than to at all, it is better If it is an ailment cal inflation. accept the cure that Strawson offers NOTES 1 'First the with definition' 'Or, what and in other are 'second words' definition' in the here refer to what comes before and con defi first us. after fused nitions (according quoted to referred traditionally to which the whole of the passage. as Hume's quoted are not to be They 'first' and 'second' passage constitutes the definition, as it appears in the Enquiry). 2 I myself believe that it is possible to reinterpret our ordinary about ine not talk absences relation open does, (see in such a way as to restore the in However, (2004)). is here since Strawson Strawson, claiming latch on without in fact reinterpretation and of the Beebee thought the current that causation context, that to a our causal claims such is a genu a move is causal to ordinary genuine regularity relation. guaranteeing 3 reason between This distinction the existence claim concerning explanation universe is rather in Strawson's implicit of than the existence regularities attainable - that '[e]ven if it is true that ultimately of the existence of the universe, there is not only no humanly but also no reason for the explanation a matter of existence of the universe, ultimately it just does not follow that everything (1991, 212). that happens is chance' REFERENCES Beebee, (eds.), Blackburn, (eds.), H.: EJ. Hall and J. Collins, in L.A. and Nothingness', Paul, 'Causing MIT and Counterfactuals, Press, Cambridge, Mass., pp. 291-308. in R. Read and K.A. Richman 'Hume S.: 2000, and Thick Connexions', 2004, Hume Debate, Routledge, London, pp. 100-112. Causes The New DOES ANYTHING HOLD THE UNIVERSE TOGETHER? Carroll, Earman, Hume, Human Clarendon Hume, Nature, Lewis, 476. D: D.: J.: 1994, J.: 1986, 1975, Laws Cambridge of Nature, on Determinism, A Primer and Selby-Bigge and Concerning and PH. Press, Dordrecht. (eds.), Enquiries of Morals, A Treatise 533 University D. Reidel, Nidditch the Cambridge. In L.A. Understanding Press, Oxford. 1978, 2nd In L.A. Principles Concerning 3rd edn, of Human 13, 455 edn, 1979, Selby-Bigge Clarendon Press, 'Counterfactual PH. Nidditch (eds.), Time's Oxford. Dependence and Arrow', Nous D.K.: Lewis, D.K.: New Lewis, Russell, 13, York. D.K.: B.: 1-26. G.: G.: 1986, Philosophical 1986a, 1913, 'Causation', 'On the Notion Papers in his 1986, Volume II, Oxford 159-172. Proceedings of University Press, of Cause', the Aristotelian Society Strawson, Strawson, Clarendon Strawson, 209-213. van 1987, 1989, Press, 'Realism The Oxford. 'The and Causation', Connexion: Philosophical Causation, Secret Realism, 37, 253-77. Quarterly and David Hume, G.: 1991, P.: Contingent on Free Reality of Natural Necessity', Oxford. Analysis 51, Inwagen, 1983, An Essay Will, Clarendon Press, Department of Government Centre of Philosophy of Manchester University Dover Street Manchester M139PL United Kingdom E-mail: helen.beebee@man.ac.uk