Tonkiss, K. (2011) 'The Right to Free Movement: Nationalism as an Obstacle to Equal Opportunity', paper presented at the PSA Annual Conference, 19th-21st April, London

The Right to Free Movement: Nationalism as an Obstacle to Equal Opportunity Katie Tonkiss, University of Birmingham KET621@bham.ac.uk Paper prepared for the Political Studies Association Conference, 19 th-21st April 2011, London Panel: National Borders: The Right to Territory and the Right to Migrate An increasing number of political theorists have argued for the recognition of the free movement of people across borders as a fundamental liberal right, on the basis that entry criteria are based on the arbitrary fact of birthplace and therefore unfairly discriminate against would-be migrants in terms of access to resources and opportunities. Many theorists have looked to the EU, where free movement rights have been widely implemented, as a model for wider migration rights at both the regional and global levels. However, free movement in the context of Europe is also emblematic of a tension between the decline of national citizenship and the persistence of nationalistic political organisation. This paper will use findings from qualitative fieldwork on the challenges of European migration in the English county of Herefordshire to explore this tension. My central claim is that the persistence of nationalism as a source of allegiance and belonging presents an obstacle to the realisation of equal access to resources and opportunities for migrants, because lines of difference continue to be drawn between ³local´ populations and new migrants. For the right to be successfully implemented, I argue, a paradigmatic shift away from nationalism as a source of belonging is required. 1. Introduction Given the vast inequalities in wealth, resources and rights that national citizenship has come to represent, theorists have questioned the moral significance of national boundaries in decisions concerning justice (Beitz, 1999; Cabrera, 2010; Caney, 2005; Pogge, 2002; Shachar, 2009; Seglow, 2005). One specific claim that has emerged is that the principle of equal opportunity should extend to the provision of free movement across borders, on the basis that nationality is morally arbitrary in decisions concerning migration from one state to another (Carens, 1987). However, the challenges surrounding the realisation of this right in the 1 context of the European Union raise an important question surrounding its compatibility with nationalist political organisation and the persistent national loyalty of citizens that stems from this. While freedom of movement has been realised for citizens of the EU, this right sits in tension with a continued emphasis on nationalistic political organisation. This paper examines the central question of whether the right to freedom of movement is compatible with the persistence of nationally-defined political communities, by exploring this theoretical question with insights from qualitative work. My central claim is that the persistence of nationalism as a source of allegiance and belonging presents an obstacle to the realisation of equal access to resources and opportunities for migrants, that defenders of free movement seek to promote. This is because lines of difference continue to be drawn between µlocal¶ populations and new migrants. For the right to be successfully implemented, I argue that a paradigmatic shift away from nationalism as a source of belonging is required. The paper is structured as follows. After first defining free movement as equality of opportunity, mainly through engagement with Joseph Carens¶ seminal account, I then move on to consider the emergence of a free movement regime in the context of the EU. However, I also highlight how the emergence of post-national integration in the EU sits in tension with a persistent emphasis on shared nationality. I then set out a framework for the exploration of this tension specifically in terms of migration, drawing on a µqualitative political theory¶ approach. The case study for this exploration focuses on Herefordshire, a site of dramatically increased EU migration since the accession of the A8 member-states in 2004 1. I then utilise some of my insights from this work to inform my central theoretical claim that national loyalty can act as a barrier to the equality of opportunity that freedom of movement intends to bring about, and thus those who support freedom of movement should also support a shift away from nationalism as a source of belonging. 2. Freedom of Movement and Equality of Opportunity It is taken as a basic liberty that individuals within a nation-state will have the freedom to work and live wherever they would like to within the boundaries of that nation-state; to prevent such a freedom would be deemed as discrimination without justifiable grounds. The A8 member-states are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Additionally, Romania and Bulgaria gained accession in 2007. Here, I will use the terms A8 and Eastern European member states inter-changeably, to refer to all of those Eastern European member states that have contributed the most large scale migration to the case study area. 1 2 Carens¶ argument for freedom of movement across state borders proceeds on similar grounds, to claim that restrictions on migration are representative of discrimination without morally justifiable reasons. While Carens is just one of a number of scholars who have argued in favour of much fewer restrictions on migration (see, for example, Blake and Risse, 2006; Cabrera, 2004: 65-8; Dummett, 2004; Hayter, 2004; Risse, 2008; Seglow, 2005; 2006), for the sake of brevity I will focus here only on his argument. Carens presents an argument for open borders based on a global application of John Rawls¶ original position (Rawls, 1971). In this original position, individuals are asked to decide on principles of justice, but they do so from behind a veil of ignorance, because µnatural and social contingencies¶ are morally arbitrary and therefore should not influence decisions over the content of such principles (Carens, 1987: 256). Carens argues that place of birth and differences in nationality should also be considered as morally arbitrary, because place of birth is unchosen, but has severe implications in terms of access to wealth and opportunities2. Given a global application of the original position, where birthplace and citizenship status are unknown, individuals in that position would, according to Carens, opt for a right to migrate as a basic liberty; on the basis that to not permit the right to migrate would be to violate the principles of justice. These principles entail, firstly, the recognition of equal basic liberty for all; and secondly, that any inequalities are to the advantage of the worst off in society, and are attached to positions that are open to all ± the µdifference principle¶ (Rawls, 1971: 53). The principle of basic equal liberty is violated if individuals are unable to migrate because this would hinder life plans on morally arbitrary grounds. Each individual is µviewed as entitled to resources and opportunities sufficient to form and pursue a robust life plan¶ (Cabrera, 2004: 65). All else being equal, the right to migrate would still be centrally important because it may be pertinent to someone¶s life plan that they migrate from one country to another (Carens, 1987: 258). Additionally, the difference principle is violated because in restricting migration, societies would be perpetuating inequalities on the basis of these morally arbitrary distinctions (ibid). Individuals would not have equal access to goods such as employment opportunities, and inequalities would not serve the worst off ± rather they would serve to reinforce inequalities between citizens of rich and poor nations. I do not have the space to defend this global application of Rawls theory fully. However, for a further robust version, see Beitz, 1999: 129-136), and for the rebuttal of some prominent critiques, see Carens (1987: 255258). 2 3 Having set out, very briefly, the basic premises of the free movement claim, I will now engage with two prominent critiques of this position, with the aim of exploring some of the fundamental issues more extensively. It is not the aim of the paper to provide a defence of the right to freedom of movement; rather its intention is to consider more fully the implications of adopting such a position and thus such a defence is not vitally necessary. However, briefly providing some defences of the position serves to further define the approach and to highlight the worth of the further investigation. The first critique undermines the argument for freedom of movement on the grounds that cultural commonality is morally significant. Theorists hold that shared national culture is centrally important in the realisation of a µmeaningful context¶ for the provision of individual autonomy (Kymlicka, 1995; Margalit and Raz, 1990; Tamir, 1993), and for the provision of democracy and welfare arrangements (Miller, 1995; 2000). Specifically on the subject of equality of opportunity, Miller offers a nuanced argument that it is impossible to talk about global equality of opportunity because the term has different meanings in different cultural contexts (Miller, 2005: 60-64). Rights and responsibilities are defined by their specific context, and we cannot claim their wider application beyond those specific contexts. Hence, the argument for freedom of movement is undermined by the assertion of moral significance for shared culture (ibid: 68-70; 2005b). Challenges to such an account must target its assertions that there is moral value in the special relationship between citizens that nationalism represents, and there are many robust responses that offer just that, which I simply flag here. Firstly, there are limited grounds on which to suggest that the national culture is representative of the full cultural diversity present within nation-states, and so to assign it with any special significance (Abizadeh, 2002: 503; 2004: 238; Mayerfeld, 1998: 563; Shachar, 2009: 147 -51; Vincent, 1997). Secondly, the goal of liberal autonomy does not support the persistence of distinct cultures, but only of some form of culture, which may mean that the significance of the cultural distinctiveness of nations is undermined (Patten, 1999). Thirdly, it cannot be conclusively demonstrated that the trust which is deemed necessary for democracy and social welfare arrangements, is necessarily unique to contexts of shared nationality (Abizadeh, 2002). A related argument for restricted migration holds that individuals have an equal right to authorship of the law on the basis that they live within the territorial boundaries of the institutions enacting those laws. This objection holds that citizens have a right to self4 determination and thus the right to restrict migration as they see fit. As Walzer notes, µthe restraint of entry serves to defend the liberty and welfare, the politics and culture of a group of people committed to one another and their common life¶ (Walzer, 2008: 154). Leaving aside the question of whether democratic coercion is neatly tailored to territorial borders3, the self-determination objection rests on the significance of voluntary cooperation: that individuals within a given system of voluntary political cooperation have more extensive obligations to each other than they have to those outside of that territory who have not entered into that voluntary cooperation (for example, Waldron, 1993). However, this does not necessarily mean that those individuals within the system of cooperation are then permitted to stop others from deciding also to join. Carens argues this point coherently: while I may have rights to exclude others from my personal property, that right is conferred by the private status of that property. The property protection argument cannot be made collectively because a liberal state, while committed to the protection of the property of the individual, makes no such commitment in terms of collective property claims that may undermine this right to equal treatment (Carens, 1987: 267-268; Risse, 2008). Thus far, I have outlined the basic tenets of Carens¶ argument for freedom of movement across national boundaries on the basis of equality of opportunity, which I intended as representative of a number of accounts which emphasise potential mobility across borders as a basic right, and have briefly summarised responses to two of the most central critiques of this position. In the course of the discussion, I have referred implicitly to the EU free movement regime, and I now want to spend some time summarising the European experience as an illustration of the free movement principle in practice. 3. Free Movement in the European Union In the EU, the principle of non-discrimination has given rise to a system of free movement, whereby citizens are provided with the equal opportunity to move on the basis that discrimination on the grounds of nationality is unlawful4. Initially, free movement stemmed Abizadeh argues coherently that democratic coercion is not restricted to national boundaries, but rather that the exercise of border control is an exertion of coercive power over those outside of national boundaries. Therefore, those outside of the national borders that are subject to such coercion have a right to democratic involvement in decisions concerning the most appropriate configuration of national borders (Abizadeh, 2008). 4 The right to free movement is set out in article 45 of the TFEU and the provisions of European citizenship are set out in part 2. The commitments of article 45 reflect those set out in the original Treaty of Rome; t hose of 3 5 from a commitment to non-discrimination in labour rights; however this has gradually been extended into the granting of formal European citizenship to citizens of member states. European citizenship involves much more extensive rights, such as rights to vote and to access social security benefits in alternative member-states to where national citizenship is held (Cabrera, 2010: 182-184; Gerhards, 2008). Such rights serve to equalise the status of those holding national citizenship and those migrating under free movement arrangements on the basis that discrimination between nationalities in the provision of rights and responsibilities is unjust. Similar migration and citizenship rights for non-citizens wishing to migrate to a member-state from outside of the EU are not yet available. However, the regional free movement present in the EU is nonetheless a useful example for the purposes of this paper because it demonstrates that a moral commitment to the arbitrary nature of nationality in the recognition of equality of opportunity has given rise to a free movement regime that transcends national boundaries, and thus reflects the argument for freedom of movement as presented in the preceding section. There are, however, significant challenges surrounding the implementation of EU citizenship and the free movement regime; specifically, these problems stem from the relationship between trans-state citizenship and persistent national forms of citizenship. immediately evident within the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU: µCitizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship¶ (EU, 2010: article 20). The intention is that EU citizenship exists in a complimentary relationship with national citizenship, and thus one may be both British and European. However, there are reasons to suggest that the dynamics of the relationship between national and European citizenship are more complex than the provisions of the treaty may allow for, and this has specific relevance for the right to freedom of movement. National identities have not subsided in Europe; on the contrary, evidence suggests that they are strongly prevalent and may even be gaining further support as the integration project part 2 were agreed as part of the Maastricht Treaty, in which the Schengen agreement of 1990 (allowing for the removal of many of the EU s border controls) was also formally integrated (European Union, 2010). This is 6 continues (Auer, 2010; Citrin and Sides, 2004). Particularly in contexts where national identity has been marginalised, such as in the cases of Scotland and Catalonia, membership of the EU has complimented greater autonomy for those regions seeking independence within Europe. However, national identity does not necessarily have such a positive relationship with European integration; rather research suggests that stronger national identity leads to lower support for the EU (Carey, 2002). Crucially for my purposes, these negative attitudes are often linked to perceived cultural threat, where the threat of the µother¶ is informed by a concern for the erosion of the national culture (McLaren, 2002; Meinhof, 2004). Thus the idea of neatly complimenting forms of citizenship is not straightforward, and the prospect of free movement between the member states only adds to these complexities. This migration is at the front-line of the contradiction between national and post-national forms of citizenship, because if citizens are increasingly seeking to assert their sense of national belonging in the EU context, the biggest site of confrontation between their desire to do this and their continued membership of the EU will be how they share their national territorial space with citizens of other member states on equal terms. Indeed, evidence suggests the existence of just such a tension. Support for nationalist and anti-EU parties, such as the BNP and UKIP in the UK, has grown particularly in European elections, as has support for many far right parties standing on anti-migration platforms across the EU ± most recently demonstrated in the success of far-right PVV in the Netherlands, again particularly in the European elections. In addition to these political expressions, incidents signalling hostility towards European citizens residing in alternative member states have also been reported, for example racist attacks on Eastern European immigrants in the Republic of Ireland in 2009, and widespread hostility toward the Roma population which most clearly spilled over into politics in France last year. The central question that these trends raise is the extent to which the persistence of the kind of loyalty that nationalism motivates then undermines the equal opportunity that freedom of movement is intended to bring about. If citizens remain loyal to their nation despite, or even due to, the development of European citizenship, it follows that they may have a greater tendency to display concerns over the effect of migration on that nation and their co-nationals, and to take a negative view of free movement rights. Thus, freedom of movement in the EU contrasted against national loyalty is representative of the contrast between post-national and national citizenship, and the forms of loyalty and belonging each of those demand. 7 4. A Framework for Exploration This dilemma between national and post-national forms of citizenship in the EU is at the heart of the theoretical question informing this paper: does persistent nationalism present a barrier to realising the equal opportunity goal of free migration? Some qualitative work was undertaken in the context of the EU to provide insight and clarification toward a robust theoretical response to this question. Theorists are increasingly drawing on qualitative findings to provide such illumination of normative assertions. Cabrera has termed this approach µqualitative political theory¶, where qualitative work µcan provide important clarity on normative claims, in part by demonstrating the implications they would or do have in lived contexts¶ (Cabrera, 2010: 101-2; see also Cabrera, 2009). The purpose is not to establish a causal relationship between variables, but rather to examine and explore how issues that are raised by theoretical enquiry play out in the real world, and then to use these findings to both inform and support theoretical assertions. The qualitative work focused on the county of Herefordshire in the UK, and I will now deviate briefly from the overall question to provide some contextual information on this before moving forward with the discussion. 4.1 European Migration to the UK The scale of migration to the UK from the A8 states post-2004 exceeded expectations. It is estimated that between 2004 and 2008, just over one million citizens of the new member states migrated to the UK. That is not to say that all one million are currently residing in the UK ± estimates in 2008 suggested that around 665,000 of those migrants were still registered for work within the UK, while others had either returned to their country of national citizenship or else moved on to another alternative member-state (Pollard et al, 2008: 17-21). However, this figure nonetheless represents a massive increase on the 50,000 accession state nationals that were estimated to be living in the UK in 2003 (ibid: 16). Significantly, the scale of this migration meant that communities that typically had not been popular destinations for migrants faced considerable periods of change5. This trend has placed particular strain on rural communities, both in terms of changing the nature of public service provision in such areas, but also in terms of impact on the µindigenous community¶. 5 In a recent Eurobarometer survey, 31% of µrural dwellers¶ Pollard et al s research identifies locations in Lincolnshire, Cambridgeshire and the rural counties of the West Midlands region (2008: 29). 8 associated the EU mainly with a µloss of cultural identity¶ (European Commission, 2010: 5), and according to a report by the Commission for Rural Communities, µThere can be a lack of awareness, by local indigenous communities, of the economic value migrant workers provide and confusion between categories of foreign people, such as migrant workers, asylum seekers and refugees, and of the different levels of rights and privileges they are each entitled to¶ (Commission for Rural Communities, 2007: 7). Tensions between different ethnic and cultural groups in the UK have commonly been framed in terms of µparallel lives¶; the observation that in many highly diverse, typically urban settings, groups within communities are so segregated that they are leading almost entirely separate lives (Home Office, 2001) and that government must do more to balance µmanaged migration¶ with µmanaged settlement¶ (Communities and Local Government, 2006: 7). According to these reports, the management of migration should not only include numbers, but also the ways in which new migrants can come to be part of the community, and how the community can better meet the needs of new populations. The focus of this qualitative study was to consider the relationship between indigenous communities and new migrants with specific reference to the European Union free movement regime, and to examine the extent to which the contrast between national and post-national forms of citizenship created problems for the realisation of the right to migrate. The study focused on one specific location in the UK that has seen vastly increased migration since A8 accession. 4.2 Herefordshire: The Local Context Herefordshire is situated to the south-west of the West Midlands region, bordering Shropshire, Worcestershire, Gloucestershire, and the Welsh county of Powys. It is a predominantly rural area of 842 square miles, with an estimated population of 178,400 (Herefordshire Partnership, 2009). The county was selected as a case study because while traditionally it has a low migrant population, these numbers have significantly increased since A8 accession in 2008. Between 2004 and 2008 it was found to have the ninth highest number of migrant workers from the A8 accession states of anywhere in the UK (35 WRS workers per 1000. Source: Pollard et al, 2008). While there is no exact measure of the numbers of migrant workers in Herefordshire, in the period 2002-2008 national insurance registrations in the county increased twelve-fold, compared with double for the rest of the UK. This demographic 9 change is also reflected in increases in the BME population of Herefordshire, by 71% from 2001 to 2007, compared to a national average of 31%. Employment on farms is the main factor driving large scale migration to Herefordshire, with between 6000 and 9000 migrant workers employed on the county¶s farms in the period 2007-2008. The majority of migrant workers have come to Herefordshire from Poland, however there are also substantial populations from Lithuania, Slovakia, Latvia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria (all facts and figures: Herefordshire, Partnership, 2009). In the 2009 European elections, UKIP gained one seat in the West Midlands region, while both the Conservatives and Labour party lost a seat each6 (UK Office for the European Parliament, 2009). In Herefordshire itself, the largest share of the vote was won by the Conservative party (35.89%), while UKIP achieved second place, and a full 29.9% of the vote was registered to nationalist and anti-EU parties (Herefordshire Council, 2009a). As a case study, Herefordshire is therefore particularly interesting as it seems to suggest public support for nationalist and anti-EU politics, despite the existence of an economic need for migrant labour in the agricultural sector. In her research on attitudes towards Central and Eastern European migrants in Herefordshire, Dawney found considerable cultural hostility in the area. She highlights trends in Herefordshire that have often been seen as typical of racism in rural areas, where the social construction of rurality as culturally homogeneous can stand in stark contrast to the reality of multicultural changes, migrants are often categorised in ways that emphasise differences between µus¶ and µthem¶ (Dawney, 2007; 2008). All of the migrants interviewed by Dawney had experienced some form of hostility from indigenous communities, and had generally not integrated into the community fully ± for example through lack of interaction with UK residents, language problems or through lack of appropriate communication from local institutions (Dawney, 2007: 4-5). The case study work undertaken consisted of ethnographic observations and a series of openended semi-structured interviews with over 40 salient individuals in the county of Herefordshire. Four key groups were targeted: political elites, local community members, nationalist group members, and migrants¶ charity volunteers. My interviewee selection was therefore guided by a purposive non-probability technique because I was interested to target 6 Note that in 2004, 7 seats were allocated to the West Midlands region. In 2009, this had changed to 6 seats. 10 specific groups and interested parties. I then used a snowballing technique to contact further individuals and to build up a rich case study of national loyalty and European migration in Herefordshire. 5. National Loyalty and Equality of Opportunity A commitment to freedom of movement implies a commitment to the principle of equal opportunity, and thus necessarily means recognising equality of opportunity whether or not someone is a co-national. In the EU where this has been implemented, there still remain persistent allowances for national loyalty and nationalist sentiment. Is a continued emphasis on national forms of citizenship and belonging such as this consistent with the realisation of the equality of opportunity that freedom of movement is intended to bring about? Migration and National Loyalty Subscribing to nationalism entails barriers to the realisation of equality of opportunity, because believing in the nation and nationalistic political organisation necessarily involves asserting priority to compatriots. In Miller¶s succinct definition, nations are conceived of as ethical communities; that is, they confer duties towards co-nationals that are more extensive than those held towards other individuals outside of the national context (Miller, 2000: 27). This priority to co-nationals is explicitly evident in the rhetoric of nationalist group members interviewed. The view of nationalist group members is that European migration should be restricted because it leads British people to neglect their co-nationals. This was summed up by a representative of the British National Party: µIt takes jobs away from British people, then there¶s the impact it has on infrastructure, healthcare and schools. It¶s a myth that the NHS is reliant on immigrants, we know plenty of British doctors and nurses who can¶t get work here. And there¶s the cost of translation, where everything has to be offered in lots of languages. We¶re paying for that¶ (author interview, August 2010). This kind of sentiment, that migration is negatively affecting the chances of British people to obtain jobs and to make use of public services, supports the idea that nationalists will display a tendency towards priority to co-nationals, something I will henceforth terms as national loyalty. This tension seems compounded by some of the rumours and assumptions about migrants as µothers¶, different to co-nationals. This concept of µothering¶ is important to the claim of the paper, because it seems often to intensify the sense of national loyalty against the 11 threat of outsiders. As one nationalist group member argued, µwe¶re ignoring our own people while encouraging immigrants to abuse our hospitality¶ (author interview, August 2010). This idea that migrants would tend to µabuse¶ the British system was particularly prevalent, and was summed up by a representative of the English Democrats: µYou¶ll get the story, don¶t you, immigrant family costing the country £250,000, or you know, this guy¶s flown in for this treatment and he¶s off again the next day.... I mean it¶s alright saying I can go to, to Italy, to Poland or whatever. I ain¶t going to go to Poland, yeah. I¶m not going to claim off their benefits system. I¶m not going to go over there and send back money for my five kids in England, yeah¶ (author interview, July 2010). The ways in which individuals distinguish between members of the in-group and those outside of it therefore is not a benign mechanism, or necessarily solely a cultural marker, but rather can have important implications about how nationalist groups justify the national loyalty that they display. In the quote above, the implicit assumption is that an individual from Italy or Poland is more likely to claim from the British benefits system and place an expensive burden on the country, than a British person who opts to migrate to an alternative country. The construction of this national loyalty by nationalist group members is further compounded by the sense that migration is undermining the recognition of the national identity, that µthe indigenous British people also exist and that is often denied. If I moved to Japan and became a Japanese citizen, a Japanese person would never say that I am as Japanese as they are, yet we are expected to say that immigrants that settle here are equally as British as I am. That¶s just not true¶ (author interview, August 2010). This quote demonstrates how strong identification with a national identity can mobilise political nationalist sentiment on the basis of feelings of national loyalty. Ultimately, allegiance that is informed by a national identity leads to national loyalty informed by a belief in the moral significance of those shared characteristics. As one interviewee put it, µThe naturalised people of this island have a right to preserve their distinct culture and way of life, and in fact those people who say that we don¶t are racist because they¶re denying this right¶ (author interview, August 2010). This sense of national loyalty and the separation of the national in-group from external µothers¶ is mirrored in occasional nationalist rhetoric which takes a more positive view of migration. In a minority of cases, where migration was thought to be permitted at all, there was a sense 12 that migrants must assimilate to the national way of life. This is summarised in the following quote from a representative of UKIP: µI¶ve got nothing against different cultures, but the ones I¶ve had here have joined the team, they did join the team.... I think if people come here, if people come here they¶ve got to not just accept the country and the benefits they get, they¶ve got to join the culture as well¶ (author interview, September 2010). On the basis of the argument that nationalism implies a sense of national loyalty that then has strong repercussions for the definition of insiders and outsiders, it follows that where people display loyalty to co-nationals, this has the potential to undermine the equality of opportunity that freedom of movement intends to bring about. This would seem to support my earlier assertion, that increased nationalist sentiment in the EU would be particularly problematic for the realisation of freedom of movement. Thus far, the use of qualitative examples has focused on politically mobilised nationalists and the quite obvious, but necessary, assertion that a belief in the nation will sit in tension with a commitment to free migration and a more widely conceived citizenship. However, the qualitative study revealed that the ways in which individuals discuss their community and their co-citizens in everyday circumstances can perpetuate problems surrounding equality of opportunity for migrants, even where those individuals are not directly challenging the free movement regime ± as in the case of nationalist group members. These forms of µbanal nationalism¶7 (Billig, 1995) represent persistent barriers to migrants in the realisation of equality of opportunity. Firstly, national loyalty to co-nationals is often explicitly evident in the views of µindigenous¶ people when they are asked about rights to free movement. As one community member said, µIt does sort of wind you up a bit when you hear people you know getting preferable treatment over people that have lived and worked here all their lives really, it does tend to leave a bitter taste¶ (author interview, August 2010). Billig s central claim is that natio nhood provides a continual background for... political discourses, for cultural products, even for the structuring of newspapers. In so many little ways, the citizenry are daily reminded of their national place in a world of nations. However, this remind ing is so familiar, so continual, that it is not consciously registered as reminding. The metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building (Billig, 1995: 8). In Billig s sense then, this term denotes the ways in which nationalism is reinforced to citizens, while in my claim I seek to emphasise more that this underlying and perhaps unconscious sense of national loyalty is perpetuated by citizens themselves. Thus my use of the term denotes this slightly different meaning. 7 13 This idea that those who have lived in the local community and contributed to it µall their lives¶ is mirrored in rhetoric surrounding access to services. Migration into Herefordshire, and such a dramatic increase, naturally led to considerable pressure on services (Herefordshire Council, 2006). The response of the indigenous population tends not to be to question the effectiveness of services in light of a changing demographic, but rather to draw on differences between the entitlements of co-nationals compared to those of migrants. As one volunteer said, µIn Poland they don¶t get these sums that they get here, and they are given apartments and this is another thing where local people get I think very angry about the migrant workers. They come here and take houses away from people, and there are not, there¶s not enough housing here¶ (author interview, July 2010). Similarly, the issue of school places seemed to initiate a response informed by national loyalty from one local woman: µI certainly know at ***¶s and ***¶s school because they go to a Catholic school, ***** School, and there¶s a lot of Eastern Europeans there because of the Catholic, they are able to get straight in there, whereas there¶s a waiting list for people that have been born and bred in Hereford (laughs). But the Eastern Europeans seem to be able to get straight in, don¶t they¶ (author interview, August 2010). The loyalty sentiment of non-nationalist group members was also similarly often informed by misperceptions about migrant workers. Often this related the view that migrants tend to be µbenefits scroungers¶, and often was informed by negativity towards gypsy and traveller communities that was linked to migrants of Eastern European origin. The general sense of fear of the unknown played a large part for many people, as one volunteer related her initial reaction to migrant workers: µYou know, for me it¶s when you¶re in Leominster and you turn a corner and suddenly see twenty Eastern European men all walking down the street. I mean, I¶m not sure if that¶s racist really, or if it¶s just about a reaction you have when you see something you don¶t expect and you¶re not used to. But it can be quite scary, in a way¶ (author interview, August 2010). One particularly interesting quote demonstrates perceptions of the difference between ingroup members and outsiders: 14 µAnd you think well, ok, but how are they vetted, you know do they have to show if they¶ve got a criminal record, do they check that, is it just made up, and like I say if we¶ve got a hundred caravans that each sleep six on our doorstep, you know, and we¶ve moved to the countryside to keep our children sort of safe and you know, away from the throngs, and we¶ve got sort of a city behind us, full of Eastern Europeans¶ (author interview, August 2010). The idea that all individuals who take up unskilled employment on farms should be subject to criminal records checks seems particularly remote from the typical expectations put on cocitizens, however the interviewee here specifically relates his concerns surrounding the farm workers to their migrant status, and his inability to know their background as outsiders. This again demonstrates how the prevalence of a banal form of national loyalty, expressed by those who would not wish themselves to be thought of as nationalists in the sense of the political parties contacted as part of the research, presents challenges for the recognition of migrant workers as claiming a status equal to that of co-nationals. National Loyalty and Equal Opportunity Why does this lack of recognition of equal status represent challenges? The answer to this question provides the central claim of this paper: that the lack of recognition of equal status brought about by persistent national loyalty presents a barrier to the realisation of the equal opportunity goal of unrestricted migration. In the case of politically mobilised nationalists, this is explicitly apparent in their calls for the UK to leave the EU and to stop migration ± either completely, or to manage it much more strictly and to place heavy assimilation requirements on those who do migrate. Concerns surrounding a rise in this kind of nationalist sentiment, particularly amongst less affluent communities in the county, arose considerably in discussions with local political elites, and nationalists themselves related increased membership in rural communities affected by European migration. In the case of the banal form of national loyalty prevalent within communities, this underlying sense of national loyalty in everyday activity and conversation contributes to a lack of robust debate concerning how best to meet the needs of migrants, and how best to manage the change that they exert in local settings. Political debate commonly focuses on whether or not the right to free movement should be recognised, rather than how best to manage the implementation of that right. Many of the local political elites interviewed related stories of doorstep conversations during periods of political campaigning, and even those taking the most positive attitude to migration were forced to moderate their views. 15 One Liberal Democrat councillor interviewed was relatively positive about migration and membership of the EU. However, when he was then asked about his experiences of campaigning, he told of how he had to moderate his claims, µBecause I was going round knocking on doors and people said to me, What are you going to do about these immigrants?´ and I said... my, my line was we need some of them in and we always have, and that would go down like a lead balloon with half of these people¶ (author interview, July 2010). A similar experience was related by volunteers working in support of migrants. A charity organisation operating within North Herefordshire worked predominantly to lobby local political elites on behalf of migrant workers, to seek to obtain better working conditions and community support; and then to provide hands-on assistance such as transport, food, and practical help for those with particular problems. However, many of the volunteers related how they had experienced stigmatisation from the rest of the community. As one volunteer related: µPeople call me sometimes, you know, you of all people how can you get involved with this lot, you know, as they call them, and I said you know, what do you mean. They say yeah, you know, how can you help these people, they don¶t belong in this country. They don¶t respect us, they don¶t talk out language and they take jobs away from us¶ (author interview, August 2010). The lack of political debate and underlying sense of national loyalty makes it then difficult for resources to be committed to providing support for migrants and their access to social and political goods. Given that the timing of the research coincided with a period of economic recession, it was particularly clear to many of the advocates of migrants spoken to that the ability of the local community and local services to provide the support that is needed for new migrants and to manage the change in the local community may be severely affected, as the government, in the absence of debate over the best ways to manage the needs and local impact of migrants, cut back on already limited support for such programmes. As one council officer described it, µI think the government won¶t give any support to this Eastern European churn, and therefore I think services like schools, EAL 8 and that, translation and interpretation are going to struggle to able to keep up with it... It is a worry though because they¶re just cutting funds so much and we always say it¶s always, it¶s always the marginalised groups, the groups that don¶t have the loudest voice that will get hit the hardest. And I don¶t care what anybody says, 8 EAL refers to educational support for those learning English as an additional language. 16 on the ground that¶s what will happen because they won¶t have the arguments to put forward, they won¶t have people fighting their corner, you know, they¶re just going to be dismissed¶ (author interview, July 2010). While migrants therefore have the right to freedom of movement, the implementation of this right does not necessarily guarantee the realisation of equality of opportunity, because persistent national loyalty hinders the ability of local actors to commit resources to services that migrants need, without facing political unpopularity. The experience of migration in Herefordshire held some commonality with the perception of µparallel lives¶ that was described earlier, whereby cultural groups are distinctly separated within the same community. The particularly problematic aspect of this for the migrant communities in Herefordshire is that while being a local µindigenous¶ community member means having access to a wide range of public services and living in a community which reflect their needs, migrants tend to live in outlying areas or in many cases actually on farms, and their presence has made very little impact on the local area. Thus the community does not reflect their needs or their way of life in the same way that it does for indigenous people, and these indigenous citizens¶ sense of national loyalty presents a barrier to that situation changing. As one political elite put it, µit¶s like they¶re invisible people¶ (author interview, July 2010). Many of the individuals interviewed, while displaying the kind of underlying sense of national loyalty described, did not perceive there to be a problem with migration because it had such a little impact on the area. Migrants were not visible, and it was only really where they were visible that issues seemed to arise. So long as the area was not changed, and migrant workers filled the employment gap to bolster the local economy, there was no problem, because µthey¶re coming, doing the work and then going¶ (author interview, August 2010), and there had been no visible change in the local demographic. Where this change was more apparent and challenged the local way of life, and migrants were more visible, interviewees were much more likely to perceive there to be a problem. Returning to my initial question about the tension between national and post-national forms of citizenship, it is my assertion that national loyalty presents a barrier to the realisation of equality of opportunity that freedom of movement is intended to bring about. When theorists are arguing for freedom of movement as a means of achieving equality of opportunity, they should be combining this with a shift away from support for nationalistic forms of political organisation, and embracing alternative forms of trans-state integration that can offer different grounds for belonging away from the binding sentiment of nationalism. It is these that are 17 most consistent with the equal opportunity goal and thus that must be embraced if that goal is to be realised. The aim of freedom of movement is not simply to allow an individual to move into another country; it is to provide that individual with the opportunity to live in another country and to enjoy an equal status as those holding national citizenship of that country. Simply arguing for freedom of movement between nation-states will not achieve that, because the kind of persistent sense of national loyalty identified in the qualitative research will continue to produce barriers to the full realisation of equality of opportunity. 6. Conclusion This paper sought to consider whether the right to freedom of movement is compatible with the persistent of nationally-defined politically communities. After first defining freedom of movement as equality of opportunity and briefly defending the position against two prominent critiques, I then considered the emergence of freedom of movement in the EU. I highlighted the tension existent in this context between national and post-national forms of citizenship, and hypothesised that migration would form a particular challenge within this tension, where the relationship between migrants and local community members is the µfront line¶ of the national/post-national dilemma. I explored this problem with insights from some qualitative work conducted in the English county of Herefordshire, and set out my central claim as follows: 1. The national loyalty that is displayed by politically mobilised nationalists presents a barrier to equality of opportunity because this form of nationalist sentiment places the entire project of freedom of movement at risk. 2. Many individuals in the local community context however also displayed evidence of national loyalty, in the way they discussed access to resources and services, and fear of migrant µothers¶. 3. 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