Endurantism and Timeless Worlds

Co-authored with Joseph Melia. Published in Analysis 67 (2007): 140-7

A Mereological Challenge to Endurantism

co-authored with Jonathan Robson. Published in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2007): 633-40

In this paper, we argue time travel is problematic for the endurantist. For it appears to be possible, given time travel, to construct a wall out of a single time travelling brick. This commits the endurantist to one of the following: (a) the wall is composed of the time travelling brick many times over; (b) the wall does not in fact exist at all; (c) the wall is identical to the brick. We argue that each of these options is unsatisfactory.

Universalism, Vagueness and Supersubstantivalism

Published in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2009): 35-42.

Sider has a favourable view of Supersubstantivalism (the thesis that all material objects are identical to the regions of spacetime that they occupy). This paper argues that given Supersubstantivalism, Sider’s argument from vagueness for (mereological) universalism fails. I present Sider’s vagueness
argument (§2-3), and explain why - given Supersubstantivalism - some but not all regions must be concrete in order for the argument to work (§4). Given this restriction on what regions can be concrete, I give a reductio of Sider’s argument (§5). I conclude with some brief comments on why this is not simply an ad hominem against Sider, and why this incompatibility of Supersubstantivalism with the argument from vagueness is of broader interest (§6).

Composition, Persistence and Identity

from the Routledge Companion to Metaphysics ed. Le Poidevin, Simons, McGonigal and Cameron (2009): 296-309.

Undermining Motivations for Universalism

forthcoming in Nous

Universalism (the thesis that for any ys, those ys compose a further object) is an answer to the Special Composition Question. In the literature there are three arguments (the arguments from elegance) that are often relied upon, but rarely examined in-depth. I argue that these motivations cannot be had by the perdurantist, for to avoid a commitment to badly behaved superluminal objects perdurantists must answer the Proper Continuant Question. Any answer to that question necessarily ensures that there is a restricted answer to the Special Composition Question that is just as elegant as universalism. Thus, if you are a perdurantist, the arguments from elegance fail to motivate universalism for there will always be a restricted composition that is just as good.

The Metaphysics of Groups

Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies

If you are a realist about groups (e.g. religious institutions, football teams, the Mafia etc.) there are three main theories of what to identify groups with. I offer reasons for thinking that two of those theories (groups as sui generis entities and groups as mereological fusions) fail to meet important desiderata. The third option is to identify groups with sets, which meets all of the desiderata if only we take care over which sets they are identified with. I then canvass some possible objections to that third theory, and explain how to avoid them.

Mereological Explanation and Time Travel

Forthcoming in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy

I have previously argued in a paper with Robson that a particular time travel scenario favours perdurantism over endurantism on the grounds that endurantists must give up on the Weak Supplementation Principle. Smith has responded, arguing that the reasons they provide are insufficient to warrant this conclusion. This paper agrees with that conclusion (for slightly different reasons: that even the perdurantist has to give up on the Weak Supplementation Principle) but argues that a new argument can be supplanted in its place.

Sider, Hawley, Sider and the Vagueness Argument

Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.

The Vagueness Argument for universalism only works if you think there is a good reason not to endorse nihilism. Sider’s argument from the possibility of gunk is one of the more popular reasons. Further, Hawley has given an argument for the necessity of everything being either gunky or composed of mereological simples. I argue that Hawley’s argument rests on the same premise as Sider’s argument for the possibility of gunk. Further, I argue that that premise can be used to demonstrate the possibility of simples. Once you stick it all together, you get an absurd consequence. I then survey the possible lessons we could draw from this, arguing that whichever one you take yields an interesting result.

Endurantism and Perdurantism

Forthcoming in the Continuum Companion to Metaphysics.