'To Control the Air': The Royal Air Force and the Development of Combined Operations Doctrine in the Inter-War Years

John Terraine wrote that, ‘It may be said, without straining verity, that bombing was what the RAF was all about…It is chiefly for that reason…that cooperating with the army and navy went right out of fashion between the wars.’ This article seeks to challenge that claim by demonstrating that in the field of Combined Operations the RAF was both aware and involved in the development of a coherent doctrine that took account of the impact that air power was having on the conduct of war. It was the question of whether Combined Operations could succeed in the face of air power, which was one that most vexed the services in the inter-war years. It will show that the RAF’s belief in ‘Control of the Air’ was the correct view and subsequently proven by those Combined Operations conducted during the Second World War.

Transformation and Innovation in the British Military from 1643 to 1945 – An Introduction

Air Power and a Liberal Way in War: The West’s Quest to Remove Battle from War

Martin Van Creveld has recently suggested that due to the changing character of war in the twenty-first century independent air power has a less sure place in the pantheon of military assets and that it is integrated assets that will have the biggest impact in future war. However, as Joel Hayward has shown air power lies at the heart of the west’s attempt to remove battle from war. Indeed, as the west has become ever more sensitive to the impact of the so-called ‘body bag syndrome’, independent air power has become seen as a viable means of achieving victory in war. The recent conflict in Libya has illustrated the impact that air power can have on the character of a conflict. The apparent advantages of air power over land, and even naval, power has seen its application in various campaigns over the past one-hundred years.

This paper will, through a series of historical case studies, illustrate the enduring legacy and relevance of independently-controlled air power. It will show that the development of air power theory has had at its core the application of force to reduce or shorten war, and that for both political and moral reasons this has become the preferred form of warfare for liberal governments. However, it will illustrate that in its independent form air power has not always achieved the results the rhetoric has suggested it will, and that integrated but independently-controlled air power has been just as effective in removing battle from war.

In examining the development of independently-controlled air power this paper considers how both governments and air power theorists have justified the use of air power rather than deploying boots on the ground. It will argue that independently-controlled air power, with a mix of independent and integrated assets, remains the ideal method of projecting power for liberal democracies that are ideological opposed to large casualty lists and that, therefore, it must be maintained to support the ability of west to continue to trade off between its key concerns of security and liberty.

Leadership Effectiveness: Conceptualising a Key Metric of Operational Military History – Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh Mallory, a Case Study

The RAF and the Development of Air Power Leadership: A Study of the Career of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory

This paper will examine the development of air power leadership in the RAF in the period 1918-1945. It will do this by charting the career of one of the service’s most controversial commanders, Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory. It will examine the endogenous and exogenous factors that impacted on the development of air power leadership in this period by looking at the issue of education, experience and training and how these factors affected Leigh-Mallory’s development as an air power leader.
It will consider the state of air power education at the RAF Staff College during the inter-war years and illustrate how the traits methodology based on the study of great men shaped the RAF’s view of leadership in this period. It will then scrutinize the RAF’s views on leadership, command and morale, which provided the educational framework for its officers. It will then compare Leigh-Mallory’s own rise to Air Rank in comparison with his peers in order to examine whether or not the idea that only those interested in bombing reached high rank. It will show that this is not the case but that a unifying concept of ‘Control of the Air’ was at the heart of the RAF’s organisational culture in this period and that Leigh-Mallory was part of this culture.
Finally this paper will look at the two of the key areas of controversy surround Leigh-Mallory’s leadership; the Battle of Britain and his leadership of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force. In examining these episodes it will look at issues such as cohesion, managing relationships, morale, persuasion and coercion, and ultimately the issue of combat power as outputs of effective leadership. This analysis will produce an understanding about the nature of RAF leadership in this period and the impact that its education had upon the operational level of war.

Operation JUBILEE and the Transformation of Air Support for Combined Operations: The Case of Command and Control and Aerial Bombardment

Operation JUBILEE, the raid on Dieppe on 19 August 1942, has remained an area of intensive and divisive debate amongst historians. Debate remains over questions relating to the reasons for the operation, authorisation for the raid, and the argument over lessons learnt. One area of the operations that has received scant attention from historians is the question about the performance of the RAF during the operation. What attention has been paid to the role of air power has concentrated on the issue of the lack of air bombardment in support of the raid. Indeed Brain Loring Villa has remarked that ‘There was a degree of callousness in Portal’s allowing a largely Canadian force to go in without the bomber support they needed.’  However, this concentration on the issue of bombardment ignores the state of Combined Operations doctrine in the early years of the Second World War, which stressed the importance of ‘Control of the Air’.

However, Operation JUBILEE has been criticised for Mountbatten’s claim over the ‘Lessons Learnt’ from the raid on the impact this had on Operation OVERLORD. Therefore, this paper examines the ‘Lessons Learnt’ thesis with reference to the transformation of air support for Combined Operations. It will contend that JUBILEE formed an important catalyst to changing thoughts over the use of air power in Combined Operations. It will do this by examining the development of Command and Control systems and the use of aerial bombardment. It will illustrate that Dieppe formed an important element of the experience being gained in 1942/43. This paper argues that while there may not be a direct link to Operation OVERLORD in 1944 operations at Dieppe had an impact during 1943 and needs to be considered as one line of development in parallel with those from other theatres of war.

Measuring Leadership Effectiveness: The 360 Degree Appraisal Method and Air Power History

Trafford Leigh-Mallory and the Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1918-1931

Traditional analyses of the RAF in the inter-war years have tended to stress its relationship with the evolution of strategic bombing to the abandon of other areas of development. However, this interpretation fails to recognise the work that was undertaken by the service with regards to other areas of air power employment. One area that has received scant attention from historians is the development of tactical air power and in particular its employment in support of mechanised forces at the end of the First World War and in the 1920s. Indeed most works that deal with the subject recognise the work of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor in the 1930s but ignore the important work undertaken by the School of Army Co-Operation in the previous decade and in particular the work of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory. This has been partly due to problem of records but also arguably because of the problem of reconciling Leigh-Mallory’s work in the 1920s with the latter image of him during the Second World War.

Therefore, this paper will seek to offer a re-analyse the role of Leigh-Mallory in the development of tactical air power in Britain. As a starting point it will analyse his role as commander of No. 8 Squadron in 1918 and the development of co-operation methods with the Tank Corps that were used successfully in the Hundred Days Campaign. It will then examine his service at the School of Army Co-Operation during the 1920s. Of particular importance will be an examination of his command of the school between 1927 and 1930, a period when the British Army were experimenting with mechanised forces. Of importance is the writing that Leigh-Mallory produced on the subject in this period, which offers and insight into RAF thinking of the subject. Finally it will look at Leigh-Mallory’s time at the Army Staff College and his relationship with Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Hugh Trenchard. Thus this paper no only offers a new insight into one of the RAF most controversial commanders but it also offers a reinterpretation of the state of the development of RAF doctrine in its early years.

The Forgotten Career of Major Trafford Leigh Mallory, 1914-1918: A Leadership Perspective

The RAF, Combined Operations Doctrine and the Raid on Dieppe

The Forgotten Career of Major Trafford Leigh-Mallory, 1914-1918

A Case Study in Army-Air Force Co-Operation: The Western Desert Air Force and the Battle for the Mareth Line, 19 – 29 March 1943

To be published in Ford, M, Rose, P, Hargreaves, A, 'Allied Military Effectiveness in the Mediterranean' (Brill, 2010)

The Embattled History of Operation JUBILEE, the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942

The Leadership Effectiveness of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory